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TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS TO HUMAN ERROR AND
HOW THEY CAN KILL YOU: UNDERSTANDING THE




TECHNOLOGY OFTEN promises increased safety in theform of reduction of human errors. One of the major argu-
ments for the move to semiautonomous and “driverless” cars is
the expected significant reduction in road accidents caused by
driver carelessness. This evolving technology may be outrunning
the development of legal principles that apply to the interaction
between sometimes careless users and machines with design fea-
tures intended to mitigate the risks resulting from human error.
Products liability analysis tends to focus either on a product’s
design or user carelessness.1 In the context of a product’s use,
there is a dynamic relationship between technological solutions
to risks and human behavior. The attempt to design out a persis-
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mentor Jim Henderson, who along with Aaron Twerski, is largely responsible for
the rigor and elegance of modern products liability law.
1 See generally, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles
and Manufacturer Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105
VA. L. REV. 127 (2019). In fairness to Abraham and Rabin’s excellent article, they
address the liability landscape for manufacturers of fully autonomous vehicles
and do not consider the issues relating to human–machine interactions in semi-
autonomous cars.
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tent pattern of accidents caused by human error can lead to a
new, perhaps unanticipated, and possibly even more dangerous
pattern of accidents caused or exacerbated by the technology.
For this reason, it is essential that products liability law proceed
from a systems approach, not considering product design and
user error in isolation. A systems approach to risk management
sees safety as an emergent property resulting from the interac-
tion between users and machines and their environment.2 It also
focuses on the risks associated with latent errors—those made
by product designers and engineers seeking to foresee the ac-
tions of human users, though sometimes introducing new and
unanticipated dangers.3
This Article argues that a systems approach to accidents in-
volving technologically advanced products, taking into account
the relationship between product design and foreseeable care-
lessness by users, is essential to ensuring that the law of products
liability does not have a negative impact on the underlying goals
of this area of law, including the promotion of increased user
safety, innovation in product design, and the affordability of use-
ful products. It is not a reformist project, however, because to a
significant extent, the modern law of products liability builds in
elements of systems thinking. For example, the design-defect
standard considers the comparative benefits to product safety of
both a potential redesign of the product and the user’s ability to
avoid the danger by the use of reasonable care. It also takes into
account the possibility of providing additional warnings and in-
structions to users as an alternative to requiring a redesign of
the product. Existing doctrines of comparative fault and appor-
tionment of liability recognize that manufacturers and users
share responsibility for safety, and that user carelessness may in
some cases be a risk that requires the manufacturer to adopt a
redesign or provide additional information. In short, the legal
2 See generally, e.g., SIDNEY DEKKER, THE FIELD GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING HUMAN
ERROR (2006); DON NORMAN, THE DESIGN OF EVERYDAY THINGS (rev. ed. 2013);
CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES
(1984); EDWARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BACK: TECHNOLOGY AND THE REVENGE
OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES (1996). The focus here is on systems thinking in
the field of accidents and risk reduction. It should not be confused with other
systems theories used in legal scholarship. See generally, e.g., Tamara Belinfanti &
Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of Systems Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U.
PA. L. REV. 579 (2018); Henry E. Smith, Systems Theory: Emergent Private Law, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NEW PRIVATE LAW (Andrew Gold et al. eds., forthcoming
2019).
3 See JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR 173–216 (1990).
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framework is already well designed to incorporate a systems ap-
proach into the analysis of accidents involving interactions of
humans and machines, as long as courts and lawyers understand
it correctly.
The Article uses, as a case study, two accidents involving a re-
cent variation on a tried-and-true product design—the Boeing
737 Max jetliner. The Max design incorporated a design feature
intended to prevent accidents caused by a pernicious observed
pattern of human error. When it failed to function as intended,
the result was disaster. Should the blame for these accidents be
placed on the manufacturer for flaws in the design of what was
intended as a safety feature? Or should the flight crews be
blamed for failing to handle an anomaly that they were trained
to deal with? Although the principal claim of this Article is that
products liability law must incorporate systems thinking in order
to deal correctly with situations like this, the Article also consid-
ers how these accidents should be analyzed under existing law.
Addressing an accident allegedly caused by both design and
warnings deficiencies and user error requires care with doc-
trines such as risk–utility balancing, superseding causation, and
comparative fault. After explaining the cause of the 737 Max
accidents in Section II, the Article explains in Section III how
modern products liability law will deal with the litigation against
Boeing. Some of the design and warnings claims are relatively
straightforward, but others implicate the subtler issues arising
out of Boeing’s efforts to design technological solutions to stub-
bornly persistent patterns of flight-crew errors in commercial
aviation. Section IV takes up the importance of a systems per-
spective on risks involving the interaction between fallible
humans and the safety features of products intended to protect
against human error.
II. THE 737 MAX ACCIDENTS
On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610 crashed into the
Java Sea shortly after departure from Jakarta, Indonesia. Soon
after takeoff, the flight crew reported control problems and re-
quested a return to the airport.4 They finally lost control after
struggling for almost ten minutes to resist what seemed to be the
4 See Mika Gro¨ndahl et al., In 12 Minutes, Everything Went Wrong: How the Pilots of
Lion Air Flight 610 Lost Control, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2018/12/26/world/asia/lion-air-crash-12-minutes.html
[https://perma.cc/BL6K-GZNT].
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airplane’s irresistible compulsion to enter a nosedive.5 Then on
March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 went down under
very similar circumstances—the flight crew reported a problem
with the flight controls, requested a return to the airport, and
crashed soon thereafter in a steep nose-down attitude.6 Both
flights were operated by Boeing’s 737 Max jetliner.7 Designed to
compete with the fuel-efficient Airbus A320neo,8 the 737 Max is
an incremental change to the ubiquitous 737 NG, itself a reen-
gineered version of a venerable design that first entered airline
service in 1968.9
Although final accident reports have not yet been released,
both accidents almost certainly involve a feature of the 737 Max
called Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System
(MCAS).10 MCAS is a “flight control law.”11 Modern jetliners,
like the 737 and its competitor from Airbus, the A320, do not
have strictly direct, unmediated connections between the flight
controls and the external control surfaces (ailerons, rudders, el-
evators, and spoilers). Rather, computers translate control in-
puts from the crew into movements of the control surfaces. This
arrangement is sometimes referred to as “fly by wire,” although
flight control systems answering to that description vary consid-
5 See Dominic Gates, Pilots Struggled Against Boeing’s 737 MAX Control System on
Doomed Lion Air Flight, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.seattletimes.
com/business/boeing-aerospace/black-box-data-reveals-lion-air-pilots-struggle-
against-boeings-737-max-flight-control-system [https://perma.cc/4LM4-EA8N].
6 See Hadra Ahmed et al., Ethiopian Airlines Pilots Followed Boeing’s Safety Proce-




8 See Jon Ostrower, The World Pulls the Andon Cord on the 737 Max, AIR CURRENT
(Mar. 12, 2019), https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/the-world-pulls-the-
andon-cord-on-the-737-max/ [https://perma.cc/QT3Y-TJ7E].
9 See Jack Nicas & Julie Creswell, Boeing’s 737 Max: 1960s Design, 1990s Comput-
ing Power and Paper Manuals, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/04/08/business/boeing-737-max-.html [https://perma.cc/H9LM-
3R3J].
10 I have tried to keep the use of aviation acronyms and jargon to a minimum,
without oversimplifying or distorting the points to be made. Any discussion of the
737 Max design and these accidents is going to require the use of some special-
ized lingo, such as MCAS and angle of attack, but hopefully the relevance of
these details will become apparent in the discussion of the applicable law. I will
try to confine the real down-in-the-weeds aeronautics discussions to the footnotes.
11 Sean Broderick et al., The Boeing 737 MAX MCAS Explained, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH. (Mar. 20, 2019), https://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/
boeing-737-max-mcas-explained [https://perma.cc/S3D3-M45W].
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erably.12 Airbus and Boeing aircraft have different flight control
laws.13 The control laws are complex, multilayered, and some-
what counterintuitive on Airbus aircraft, while Boeing’s laws
more or less correspond to basic, old-school control inputs—
pull back on the yoke, the nose points up; push forward on the
yoke, the nose points down.14 However, even on Boeing aircraft,
there are a few built-in interventions, designed in for opera-
tional or safety reasons, and MCAS is a significant one.15
The purpose of MCAS is to prevent an inadvertent aerody-
namic stall during certain, relatively unusual flight conditions.
To non-pilots, the word “stall” may suggest something wrong
with the aircraft’s engines. (My children, who are learning to
drive stick-shift, frequently stall the car in that sense.) An aero-
dynamic stall, on the other hand, occurs when the wing exceeds
its critical angle of attack. Angle of attack (AOA) is the angle
between the chord line (the straight line connecting the leading
and trailing edges of the wing) and the relative wind.16
Figure 1
Exceeding the critical angle of attack causes the airflow
around the wing to separate and create such an excess of drag
over lift that the wing can no longer function to keep the air-
plane on the desired flight path. The result is a loss of control if
12 See Mac McClellan, Can Boeing Trust Pilots?, AIR FACTS (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://airfactsjournal.com/2019/03/can-boeing-trust-pilots [https://perma.cc/
YZ6X-DT2J].




15 Yaw damping to prevent Dutch roll is a more familiar intervention in the
flight control system and is part of every modern jetliner. See Bjorn Fehrm, Boe-
ing’s Automatic Trim for the 737 MAX Was Not Disclosed to the Pilots, LEEHAM NEWS
(Nov. 14, 2018), https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/boeings-automatic-trim-
for-the-737-max-was-not-disclosed-to-the-pilots [https://perma.cc/43TN-UWG9].
Leeham News is a respected aviation industry blog.
16 See H.H. HURT, JR., AERODYNAMICS FOR NAVAL AVIATORS 22 (rev. ed. 1965).
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the incipient stall is not corrected. AOA is not the same as deck
angle, which is the angle between the longitudinal axis of the
airplane and the ground. As every aeronautical textbook will tell
you, an airplane can stall at any flight attitude—what matters is
AOA.17 Importantly, while every wing has a constant critical
AOA, the wing will stall at different airspeeds depending on the
weight of the aircraft, the load on the wings, the use of flaps,
and other factors.18 Pilots of most civilian aircraft use airspeed as
a rough proxy for AOA because the latter parameter is not dis-
played directly, but strictly speaking, it is incorrect to talk about
a wing stalling at a particular airspeed.19
Although not stalling is pretty much the most basic task in
flying, several recent airline accidents involved the failure of the
flight crew to recognize and recover from an inadvertent stall.
Most prominently, the crash of Air France Flight 447 in the
South Atlantic resulted from the flying pilot’s incorrect response
to a temporary loss of airspeed data and the failure of the three-
person crew to recognize that the A330 airliner was descending
in a fully developed stall.20 The crash of Colgan Flight 3407 on
arrival to Buffalo, New York, was also caused by a stall—this one
resulting from the failure of the crew to add power after leveling
off on a descent into the airport with the autopilot set to capture
and hold a preset altitude, and the crew’s subsequent bungling
of what should have been a simple recovery.21
17 See, e.g., WOLFGANG LANGEWIESCHE, STICK AND RUDDER: AN EXPLANATION OF
THE ART OF FLYING 18–24 (1944). I recently experienced a stall in a nearly vertical
dive coming out of a loop during aerobatics training.
18 See id. at 18–21.




20 See William Langewiesche, The Human Factor, VANITY FAIR (Oct. 2014),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-flight-447-crash
[https://perma.cc/B38D-83WY]. Langewiesche is a pilot and aviation journalist
and the son of Wolfgang, the author of STICK AND RUDDER; his article is by far the
best popular account of the Air France 447 accident. If it has a weakness, it is that
it makes the actions of the flight crew seem utterly inexplicable. For a more tech-
nical analysis of the accident, written by an A330 training captain for a U.S. air-
line, which explains if not excuses the performance of the flight crew, see BILL
PALMER, UNDERSTANDING AIR FRANCE 447 (2013). See also ROGER RAPOPORT &
SHEM MALMQUIST, ANGLE OF ATTACK: AIR FRANCE 447 AND THE FUTURE OF AVIA-
TION SAFETY (2017).
21 See generally NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSC/AAR-1010, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
REPORT: LOSS OF CONTROL ON APPROACH, COLGAN AIR, INC. OPERATING AS CONTI-
NENTAL CONNECTION FLIGHT 3407, BOMBARDIER DHC-8-400, N200WQ, CLARENCE
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In order to realize the benefit of larger, more fuel-efficient
CFM LEAP engines, the 737 Max design situated the engines
slightly farther forward and higher as compared with the previ-
ous 737 NG.22 The result of the new engine placement on the
Max was that, in conditions of an accelerating, banking flight,
an increase in thrust by the flight crew could cause a pitch-up
tendency, leading to an angle of attack dangerously close to the
critical angle.23 Boeing could have informed airline customers
CENTER, NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 12, 2009 (2010), https://www.ntsb.gov/investiga
tions/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1001.pdf [https://perma.cc/YES7-HD9N].
One of the first things an instructor made me do as part of my transition training
to a highly automated aircraft is replicate the Colgan 3407 scenario with the
autopilot and recover the resulting stall. It is a non-event if done properly.
22 See Jack Nicas et al., New Evidence in Ethiopian 737 Crash Points to Connection to
Earlier Disaster, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/
15/business/boeing-ethiopian-crash.html [https://perma.cc/2ET9-WE8B];
Gregory Travis, How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer, IEEE
SPECTRUM (Apr. 18, 2019), https://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/aviation/how-
the-boeing-737-max-disaster-looks-to-a-software-developer [https://perma.cc/
J7PG-6DHB]. “NG” stands for “Next Generation” and includes the 737-600, -700,
-800, and -900 series aircraft. If you have flown in the last ten years on a 737 with
Southwest, United, Delta, or American, it was almost certainly an NG.
23 Travis, supra note 22. Another way to put the point is to say that the 737 Max
exhibited less longitudinal stability than the predecessor 737 NG. Longitudinal
stability refers to the tendency of a properly trimmed aircraft to return to the
flight condition it was trimmed for if temporarily disturbed. See NAT’L AERONAU-
TICS & SPACE ADMIN., IS-97/08-DFRC-WUT, INFORMATION SUMMARY: WIND-UP
TURN (1997), https://www.scribd.com/document/53095046/NASA-Informa-
tion-Summaries-Wind-Up-Turn [https://perma.cc/DA8R-EZML] (last visited
Oct. 31, 2019). The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification stan-
dards for transport-category aircraft specify as follows, under the heading of “Stall
characteristics”:
It must be possible to produce and to correct roll and yaw by unre-
versed use of the aileron and rudder controls, up to the time the
airplane is stalled. No abnormal nose-up pitching may occur. The longi-
tudinal control force must be positive up to and throughout the
stall. In addition, it must be possible to promptly prevent stalling
and to recover from a stall by normal use of the controls.
14 C.F.R. § 25.203(a) (1995) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the certification
standards specify a stable stick-force curve throughout various regimes of flight.
See 14 C.F.R. § 25.175(a) (2004). Stick force refers to the force pilots feel in the
flight controls when they attempt to move the airplane from the flight path it is
trimmed for. See McClellan, supra note 12. As described in a well-reported article,
the challenge for Boeing engineers was to keep the stick-force curve smooth
throughout a test maneuver designed to determine the longitudinal stability of
the aircraft in a maneuver that would almost never be encountered in normal
airline operations (a steep descending turn during which the pilots keep the air-
speed constant, which requires constantly increasing the angle of attack). See Do-
minic Gates & Mike Baker, The Inside Story of MCAS: How Boeing’s 737 MAX System
Gained Power and Lost Safeguards, SEATTLE TIMES (June 22, 2018), https://
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of this difference in handling between the NG and the Max, and
the airlines could have trained their flight crews to anticipate
the pitch-up and compensate with forward pressure on the yoke.
The company was keen, however, to market the Max as requir-
ing no additional training for flight crews because it handled
exactly like the NG.24 It particularly wanted to avoid requiring
pilots to undergo time-consuming simulator training before
transitioning from the NG to the Max.25 Boeing’s solution was
therefore to incorporate MCAS—a software-based modification
to the airplane’s flight control laws that automatically trims the
nose down to prevent exceeding a specified angle of attack in
unusual flight attitudes, including both high-speed and low-
speed banking turns.26
“Trim” in this case refers to the angle at which the horizontal
stabilizer—part of the tail of the aircraft—is set.27 On large air-
line jets, the stabilizer can be angled up or down to cause the
nose to go down or up, respectively, which is referred to as the
pitch attitude of the aircraft. Pitch trim is constantly being ad-
justed during flight, either by the flight crew or by the flight
management computer. Pilots can change the pitch trim with
either an electrical switch under the pilot’s thumb on the con-
trol yoke or a manual wheel on either side of the center pedes-
tal. MCAS was designed to operate in the background by adding
some nose-down trim when the crew was hand-flying the plane
(i.e., not on autopilot) and approaching the critical angle of at-




24 See James Glanz et al., After a Lion Air 737 Max Crashed in October, Questions
About the Plane Arose, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
02/03/world/asia/lion-air-plane-crash-pilots.html [https://perma.cc/JE2Z-
QQHD].
25 Some reporting indicates that Boeing had agreed to give Southwest Airlines,
a long-time purchaser of large numbers of 737 aircraft, a rebate of $1 million per
plane if the Max required additional simulator training for crews already quali-
fied on the NG. See Gates & Baker, supra note 23.
26 See id.; Fehrm, supra note 15; Jack Nicas et al., Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions
into 737 MAX, Blind to a Late Design Change, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/06/01/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html [https://
perma.cc/YU4F-CTFT].
27 See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA-H-8083-25B, PILOT’S HANDBOOK OF AERONAU-
TICAL KNOWLEDGE 3-6 (2016), https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/hand
books_manuals/aviation/phak/media/pilot_handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HWP5-FDRW].
28 See Broderick et al., supra note 11.
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vention systems but, significantly, did so in the background, not
observed or controlled in any way by the pilots.29 Voila`, an up-
dated 737 that flew just like the familiar NG, without the need
for expensive flight-crew retraining.30
Of course, any electrical system can malfunction. That obser-
vation is not limited to software-driven control systems like
MCAS but to any electrical connection between flight controls
and control surfaces. Pilots have always known about, and are
trained to deal with, a problem known as trim runaway (or a
stabilizer runaway). For a variety of reasons, an electric pitch-
trim system may go haywire and command excessive nose-up or
nose-down trim attitudes. The procedure for dealing with a trim
runaway is simple and committed to memory by flight crews—
disable the electrical pitch-trim system, leaving only the manual
wheels on the center console for making trim changes, while
also not allowing the airspeed to get too high, which would
make manual retrimming difficult or impossible.31 Significantly,
the very same plane that crashed the next day as Lion Air 610
experienced a trim runaway on its inbound flight to Jakarta.32 A
company pilot riding in the jumpseat correctly diagnosed the
problem, the crew shut off the electric trim, and the plane
landed safely.33 Journalist (and pilot) James Fallows reported on
at least four incidents in which pilots for U.S. airlines dealt with
29 See Gates & Baker, supra note 23.
30 See id.
31 See James Glanz et al., What the Lion Air Pilots May Have Needed to Do to Avoid a
Crash, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/
11/16/world/asia/lion-air-crash-cockpit.html [https://perma.cc/P6JB-MFNV];
Ted Reed, United Pilot Leader Says Boeing 737Max and 727 Runaway Trim Recovery
Procedures Are Similar, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
tedreed/2018/11/17/united-pilot-leader-says-boeing-737max-and-727-auto-stall-
recovery-systems-are-similar/#7cfb91b5f0f0 [https://perma.cc/66LG-D55Z]. The
electric pitch-trim system is taken out of the loop using two STAB TRIM CUT-
OUT switches located on the center pedestal, between the captain’s and first
officer’s seats. See Mike Baker & Dominic Gates, Boeing Altered Key Switches in 737
MAX Cockpit, Limiting Ability to Shut Off MCAS, SEATTLE TIMES (May 10, 2019),
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-altered-key-
switches-in-737-max-cockpit-limiting-ability-to-shut-off-mcas/ [https://perma.cc/
KW8A-TLNX] (last updated May 14, 2019). The runaway trim procedure is a
memory item, meaning it is performed without reference to checklists, because it
must be executed quickly.
32 See Alan Levin & Harry Suhartono, Pilot Who Hitched a Ride Saved Lion Air 737
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unexpected MCAS activations or other pitch-trim issues without
difficulty.34 It would thus appear that any additional risk intro-
duced into the 737 Max design by the inclusion of MCAS was
mitigated by procedures already trained and practiced by flight
crews operating the 737 NG.35
Nevertheless, preliminary reports on the Lion Air 610 and
Ethiopian Airlines 302 accidents suggest that both involved a
sudden, rapid, un-commanded nose-down trim input likely re-
sulting from erroneous air data received by the flight manage-
ment computer (which includes the MCAS control laws).36 The
relevant data pertains to the airplane’s AOA and comes from at
least one of two sensors or vanes on either side of the nose of
the plane.37 There is some evidence that a bird strike may have
damaged the AOA sensor on the Ethiopian Airlines flight,38 and
the AOA sensor on the Lion Air accident aircraft had been re-
placed in the days preceding the accident but was still perform-
ing incorrectly.39 Regardless of the reason for the failures of the
34 James Fallows, Here’s What Was on the Record About Problems with the 737 Max,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2019/03/heres-
what-was-on-the-record-about-problems-with-the-737-max/584791/ [https://
perma.cc/EQ5R-H2TP].
35 That is the view taken by William Langewiesche, the aviation journalist and
pilot who unequivocally blamed pilot error for both the Lion Air and Ethiopian
Airlines crashes. See William Langewiesche, What Really Brought Down the 737
Max?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/
magazine/boeing-737-max-crashes.html [https://perma.cc/4T7C-9M7Q] (last
updated Oct. 29, 2019). His conclusion is damning:
What we had in the two downed airplanes was a textbook failure of
airmanship. In broad daylight, these pilots couldn’t decipher a vari-
ant of a simple runaway trim, and they ended up flying too fast at
low altitude, neglecting to throttle back and leading their passen-
gers over an aerodynamic edge into oblivion. They were the decid-
ing factor here—not the MCAS, not the Max.
Id.
36 See Todd C. Frankel, Sensor Cited as Potential Factor in Boeing Crashes Draws





38 See Leslie Josephs, US Aviation Officials Think a Bird Strike Was Factor in 737
Max Crash, CNBC (May 21, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/21/boeing-
shares-rise-after-report-that-a-bird-strike-may-have-caused-737-max-crash.html
[https://perma.cc/CFJ9-CNHD].
39 Firdaus Hashim, Angle-of-Attack Sensor Replaced Before 737 Max Crash, FLIGHT-
GLOBAL (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/angle-of-at
tack-sensor-replaced-before-737-max-crash-453455/ [https://perma.cc/4KTV-
8VFG].
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AOA sensors, the big problem is that the MCAS flight control
laws took into account air data from only one of the two availa-
ble AOA sensors, rather than comparing data from both.40 Un-
reliable AOA data had the potential to trigger the nose-down
trim input from the MCAS system, even though the airplane’s
pitch attitude was normal.41 It seems inexplicable now that Boe-
ing would have incorporated a single point of failure into the
MCAS design. However, Boeing concluded that the single AOA
sensor was sufficient in light of two factors: (1) the limitation of
MCAS to operation in very unusual flight regimes (high-speed
and low-speed banking turns); and (2) the assumption that
flight crews would deal promptly (within three seconds) and
correctly with any pitch-trim anomalies caused by erroneous
MCAS operation.42 Apparently, however, the crew of Ethiopian
Airlines 302 did employ the procedure of cutting off the electric
pitch trim but were still unable to recover.43 Subsequent tests in
a 737 simulator suggest that the MCAS system was aggressive
enough to place the aircraft so severely out of trim that a recov-
ery was impossible using back pressure on the yoke and the
manual trim wheel, due to aerodynamic forces at high
airspeeds.44
40 See Gates & Baker, supra note 23.
41 See id.
42 See id. (noting that Boeing calculated the probability of a hazardous MCAS
failure as 1 in 223 trillion flight hours).
43 See Ahmed et al., supra note 6.
44 See Dominic Gates, Why Boeing’s Emergency Directions May Have Failed to Save
737 Max, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/
boeing-aerospace/boeings-emergency-procedure-for-737-max-may-have-failed-on-
ethiopian-flight [https://perma.cc/9D9X-VVY8]. Widely read aviation blogger
and airline pilot Patrick Smith summarizes the analysis of the cockpit voice re-
corder and flight data recorder data that indicate the crew took appropriate cor-
rective action but were thwarted by an aerodynamic effect that makes it
impossible to move the manual trim wheel while holding back pressure on the
yoke. See Patrick Smith, Ethiopian, Lion Air, and the 737 Max, ASK THE PILOT,
https://www.askthepilot.com/ethiopian-737max-crash [https://perma.cc/45QA-
79SM] (last updated Oct. 25, 2019); see also Ahmed et al., supra note 6. The only
way to counteract this effect would be to relax back pressure, thus relieving aero-
dynamic process on the stabilizer, while simultaneously rolling in lots of nose-up
trim. Smith rightly calls this an extremely counterintuitive response. See Smith,
supra. Apparently, this procedure was part of first-generation (pre-NG) 737 flight
manuals and training but has not been trained or referred to in standard operat-
ing procedures for decades. See Gates, Why Boeing’s Emergency Directions May Have
Failed, supra (noting that an Australian pilot had posted and discussed the “roller
coaster” technique from a 1982 manual). A subsequent article by Dominic Gates,
a long-time aviation journalist in Boeing’s home town (until very recently), re-
ports that a U.S.-based airline crew tried the roller coaster technique in a simula-
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The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grounded
the 737 Max soon after the Ethiopian accident, following similar
action by aviation authorities in other countries.45 The aircraft
remains out of service worldwide as of October 2019 and is not
expected to reenter service until later in the year at the earli-
est.46 Boeing has announced several design changes to the air-
craft, including incorporating air data from both AOA sensors
into the operation of MCAS and limiting the nose-down trim the
system can force against contrary actions by the flight crew.47
III. BOEING’S EXPOSURE UNDER MODERN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW
A number of lawsuits have already been filed against Boeing,
and more are sure to follow, alleging faults—“defects” in prod-
ucts liability parlance—in the design of the 737 Max or in the
warnings and instructions provided to airline training depart-
ments and flight crews. The complaints cite a number of doctri-
tor and was able to recover, but they lost 8,000 feet of altitude in the process;
Ethiopian Airlines 302 was never more than 8,000 feet above ground level. See
Dominic Gates, How Much Was Pilot Error a Factor in the Boeing 737 Max Crashes?,
SEATTLE TIMES (May 15, 2019), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-
aerospace/how-much-was-pilot-error-a-factor-in-the-boeing-737-max-crashes
[https://perma.cc/WD7A-44LA]; see also Sean Broderick, Ethiopian MAX Crash
Simulator Scenario Stuns Pilots, AVIATION DAILY (May 10, 2019), https://aviation
week.com/commercial-aviation/ethiopian-max-crash-simulator-scenario-stuns-pi
lots [https://perma.cc/8LKV-TRN5].
45 See Thomas Kaplan et al., Boeing Planes Are Grounded in U.S. After Days of Pres-
sure, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/busi
ness/canada-737-max.html [https://perma.cc/2RG4-7RWC]; Luz Lazo et al., In-
vestigators Find 2nd Piece of Key Evidence in Crash of Boeing 737 Max 8 in Ethiopia,




46 See Leslie Josephs, Costs Pile Up for Airlines as Boeing 737 Max Grounding Enters
Eighth Month, CNBC (Oct. 13, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/13/boe
ing-737-max-grounding-enters-eighth-month-driving-up-airline-costs.html [https:
//perma.cc/KEB8-ZXYJ]; Andrew Tangel et al., Trials Near for Boeing 737 MAX
Fix, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-ceo-
promises-greater-transparency-on-737-max-11560697321 [https://perma.cc/
66JC-25YF]. A significant unknown is whether additional simulator training will
be required for 737 Max crews. There is currently only one Max simulator in
North America, owned by Air Canada. See Patti Waldmeir et al., Return to Service of
Boeing 737 Max Could Depend on Pilot Training, FIN. TIMES (May 28, 2019), https://
www.ft.com/content/a7dd933a-7e5c-11e9-81d2-f785092ab560 [https://perma.cc
/FCA5-N6AV].
47 See Gates & Baker, supra note 23.
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nal bases for liability, including negligence, strict liability, and
breach of implied warranty.48 As discussed below, in modern
products liability law, following the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability, these claims should be understood
functionally as alleging one of three types of defects—manufac-
turing, design, or instructions or warnings.49 The currently prev-
alent risk–utility test compares the existing product, and the
information provided with it, to a hypothetical redesigned prod-
uct or information that should have been provided. If the fail-
ure to incorporate the design change or to provide the
additional warnings renders the product not reasonably safe,
the manufacturer is liable.50 The question is therefore whether
the 737 Max, as delivered, was defective, and whether the design
and information changes contemplated by Boeing will render
the aircraft reasonably safe going forward.
It took a while for courts to work this out, but it is now well
understood that a products liability action seeks to hold the
manufacturer to a standard of reasonableness in the design and
provision of information (i.e., instructions and warnings).51 An
early California Supreme Court opinion insisted that the cause
of action for a defective product should not burden the plaintiff
with an element that “rings of negligence.”52 But the court also
recognized that the manufacturer should not be held absolutely
liable, as an insurer of product users.53 The effort to walk the
tightrope between avoiding a test that rings of negligence and
avoiding imposing absolute liability preoccupied courts in the
early decades of the development of products liability law. For
example, cases arose where safety technology advanced between
the time of manufacture of the product and the occurrence of
48 See, e.g., Complaint at 9–18, Abdalla v. Boeing Co., No. 1:19-cv-04162 (N.D.
Ill. June 20, 2019); Complaint at 13–16, Soegiyono v. Boeing Co., No. 1:19-cv-
03415 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2019); Complaint at 48–62, Vdovic v. Boeing Co., No.
2:19-cv-01455-DCN (D.S.C. May 17, 2019); Complaint at 48–62, Thugge v. Boeing
Co., No. 2:19-cv-01443-DCN (D.S.C. May 17, 2019); Complaint at 11–16, K’Obien
v. Boeing Co., No. 1:19-cv-03285 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2019); Complaint at 11–16,
Kondaveeti v. Boeing Co., No. 1:19-cv-02597 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2019); Complaint
at 18–26, Debets v. Boeing Co., No. 1:19-cv-02170 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2019).
49 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. n (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
50 See id. § 2 cmt. a.
51 Id.
52 Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 1972).
53 See id. at 1162.
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the accident.54 If liability was truly strict for design defects, the
manufacturer should be liable, even if it acted reasonably.55
Courts tended to reject this conclusion, however.56 The belief
that liability for defective products must be strict also tied courts
into knots when they attempted to work out the relevance of
user misconduct—is it possible to compare user negligence and
strict products liability?57 Modern courts are much more com-
fortable admitting that the test for design defect and inadequate
instructions or warnings is conceptually similar to negligence,
although with some distinctive features.58
A. DESIGN DEFECT
Modern products liability law begins with section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which purported to create a
rule of strict tort liability for anyone who “sells any product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer.”59 Many of the first generation of products liability cases
involved what is now known as a manufacturing defect, in which
the particular product that caused injury had deviated, usually
as a result of some glitch in the production process, from the
manufacturer’s specifications for the product.60 Those cases are
relatively easy to conceptualize as strict liability; the manufac-
turer’s liability flows from nothing more than the sale of a prod-
uct departing from its intended design, where the departure
54 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 reporters’ note cmt. d
(II)(A).
55 See id. § 2 cmt. a.
56 See, e.g., Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 748–50 (Tex.
1980).
57 See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 155–58 (3d Cir. 1979).
58 See, e.g., Webb v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 692 A.2d 343, 351 (Vt. 1996).
59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965). The de-
velopment of strict liability in tort occurred in parallel with the elaboration of the
alternative doctrinal basis of implied warranties of merchantability in contract
law. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 76–84 (N.J. 1960).
Breach of implied warranty eventually was folded into the generic cause of action
for defective products, which sounds primarily in tort. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmts. n, r. Contract-based recovery for design defect is
still an important fallback theory of liability in a few special cases, particularly for
claims for pure economic losses. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval,
Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870–73 (1986). For the most part, however, a design-defect
claim is handled as a matter of tort law, under the Third Restatement’s
risk–utility test. See discussion infra section III.A.1.
60 See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441–44 (Cal. 1944);
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916).
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renders the product unreasonably dangerous.61 The much more
difficult issue arises where the plaintiff alleges that the manufac-
turer’s specifications are themselves “defective.” As the Califor-
nia Supreme Court observed, in an important early case, “[a]
defect may emerge from the mind of the designer as well as
from the hand of the workman.”62 If the claim is that the design
itself is faulty, however, the issue is what baseline should be used
to determine if there is a deviation from an appropriate de-
sign.63 The baseline has to be a hypothetical design that should
have been employed but was not.64 And, the evaluation of a de-
sign defect relative to that baseline inevitably involves balancing
the risk of the existing design with the disutility involved in any
redesign that would eliminate or mitigate the risk.65 The Second
Restatement’s language of “defective condition unreasonably
dangerous” thus suggested a test that is strict liability in theory
but negligence in application.66
Early efforts to address the design-defect issue picked up on a
comment to section 402A of the Second Restatement, which
said that a product is unreasonably dangerous if it is “dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowl-
edge common to the community as to its characteristics.”67 The
so-called consumer expectations test worked well enough for
everyday products with safety aspects that are easily understanda-
ble.68 A chef’s knife is not defective in design just because it can
take off a user’s fingertip. The danger of the knife is exactly that
which would be contemplated by a reasonable consumer.69 It
61 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmts. a, c.
62 Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 1972).
63 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmts. a, d.
64 Id. § 2 cmt. d.
65 Id.
66 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
(emphasis added).
67 Id.
68 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 reporters’ note cmt. d
(II)(D).
69 One subtle aspect of this analysis is that the obviousness of the danger can-
not, by itself, yield the conclusion that there is no defect in the design of the
product. Some early cases followed the so-called patent danger rule, under which
the obviousness of a defect was an absolute defense. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d & reporters’ note cmt. d (IV)(C). Modern caselaw
almost uniformly rejects the per se aspect of the patent danger rule, while consid-
ering the obviousness of a danger as a factor to be taken into account in
risk–utility balancing. See id. The chef’s knife is not defective in design, not be-
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soon became apparent to courts, however, that a test referring
to the expectations of ordinary consumers was useless to evalu-
ate the design of complex products or to deal with tradeoffs be-
tween the safety and utility of a product.70 As the Oregon
Supreme Court recognized in an influential case, an ordinary
consumer would expect a pickup truck to be able to run over a
rock of one or two inches diameter on the road but probably
has no expectation regarding a six or eight inch rock.71 Then, in
one of the handful of most important decisions in the develop-
ment of products liability law, the California Supreme Court
limited the consumer expectations test to situations in which
everyday experience would be sufficient to permit the trier of
fact to infer that the product failed to perform as a reasonable
consumer would expect.72 In a case involving a product of any
real complexity, the plaintiff’s burden of production includes
introducing sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of
fact can conclude that the manufacturer erred in its balance of
competing product design considerations.73 Specifically, the jury
must be instructed that it should consider whether the product’s
design embodies “excessive preventable danger.”74 This is
known as the risk–utility test. It has come to be the decisive ma-
jority approach in state courts,75 and it is the exclusive test (with
cause the danger is open and obvious, but because there is no way to mitigate the
risk without undermining the utility of the product or transforming it into a dif-
ferent product altogether, such as a mandoline.
70 See Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806, 808–09 (Or. 1967).
71 See id. at 809–10.
72 See Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308–10 (Cal. 1994).
73 See id. at 308.
74 Id. at 308 (citing Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978)).
75 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defec-
tive Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 887 (1998). South Carolina and Illi-
nois, where most of the products liability lawsuits against Boeing have been filed,
both follow the risk–utility test. See Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 701 S.E.2d 5, 14
(S.C. 2010); Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 901 N.E.2d 329, 352 (Ill. 2008). Illi-
nois has an oddball procedure in which if either the plaintiff or the defendant
seeks jury instructions on risk–utility factors, the court will give them. See Mikolajc-
zyk, 901 N.E.2d at 352–53. Since it is almost inevitable that one side will prefer the
risk–utility approach, the Illinois procedure creates a de facto exclusive
risk–utility test, while claiming to also recognize the alternate consumer expecta-
tions test. See id. Aaron Twerski has recently argued that even states claiming to
adhere to the consumer expectations test are de facto risk–utility jurisdictions
because plaintiffs’ lawyers, wishing to avoid losing on summary judgment, inevita-
bly introduce evidence of a reasonable alternative design and are prepared to
argue their theory of defect on risk–utility considerations. See Aaron D. Twerski,
An Essay on the Quieting of Products Liability Law 5, 12 n.63 (n.d.) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author).
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a few exceptions not relevant to this discussion) employed by
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.76
As its name suggests, the risk–utility test comes full circle,
from the supposed innovation of strict liability for defective
products represented by the Second Restatement’s influential
section 402A, to the use of ordinary negligence principles to an-
alyze design defects and information (warnings and instruc-
tions) deficiencies.77 The benefits of a proposed redesign are
compared with the existing product design, and at root, the test
is simply whether, from the point of view of a reasonable person,
the redesign represents a better net balance of safety, cost, and
other factors bearing on the utility of the product.78 This is a
negligence test in substance. The only sense in which the mod-
ern law of design defect retains aspects of strict liability is in its
focus on the product itself, rather than the conduct of engi-
neers, executives, and other agents of the manufacturer.79 In
practice, this is often a distinction without a difference. During
investigation and discovery, the plaintiffs generally learn infor-
mation pertaining to the manufacturer’s decision-making pro-
cess and can show that the defendant’s agents acted
unreasonably by making unreasonable risk–utility tradeoffs.
This kind of proof is not necessary, however, and the plaintiff
may make out a prima facie case of liability for design defect
entirely by introducing evidence of a feasible alternative design
(almost always using one or more expert witnesses).80 Whatever
evidence emerges in discovery about the conduct of Boeing en-
gineers or managers, the jury considers only whether the plain-
tiff’s proposed alternative design is a reasonable alternative
design, with reasonableness being evaluated along the lines of
conventional negligence analysis. To the extent evidence about
the conduct of Boeing agents bears on the reasonableness of the
alternative design, it is relevant and may be admitted, but it is
not necessary for the plaintiff’s claim to survive summary judg-
76 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
77 See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 539, 613–15 (1980). See
generally Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design,
supra note 75.
78 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d.
79 See, e.g., Garrett v. Hamilton Standard Controls, Inc., 850 F.2d 253, 257–58
(5th Cir. 1998) (interpreting Texas law); cf. Davis v. Globe Mach. Mfg. Co., 684
P.2d 692, 696 (Wash. 1984).
80 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f.
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ment.81 In that sense, and in that sense only, the design-defect
test retains a flavor of strict liability. At its conceptual heart, how-
ever, it is a negligence analysis.82
1. The Third Restatement Design-Defect Analysis
The key to the Third Restatement risk–utility analysis is proof
of a reasonable alternative design (RAD), which proceeds in this
way: the plaintiff introduces evidence that some sort of redesign
of the product was technologically and economically feasible at
the time of the sale of the product.83 The jury is then instructed
that it should consider whether the plaintiff’s proposed redesign
is a RAD. A product is defective in design if the manufacturer’s
failure to incorporate a RAD renders the product not reasona-
bly safe.84 It is an analytic point that the jury’s determination
that a proposed redesign is a RAD entails the conclusion that
the product is defective in design. The Third Restatement test
requires the trier of fact to balance the relative advantages and
disadvantages of the product as designed, compared with the
plaintiff’s proposed alternative.85 In doing so, it considers a
number of factors, including the severity and likelihood of fore-
seeable risks associated with the product as designed, and the
likely impact of the proposed redesign on production costs;
product longevity, usability, aesthetics, and maintenance; and
expectations consumers have regarding the product’s perform-
ance and safety aspects.86 An influential law review article, from
which the Third Restatement test was drawn, boils the test down
to the following consideration: “The manufacturer’s ability to
eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing
its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.”87
81 See id. § 2 cmt. n.
82 True strict liability exists for manufacturing defects where the particular
product that caused the plaintiff’s harm departed from its intended design. See id.
§ 2(a). Nothing that has been reported about the Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian
Airlines 302 accidents suggests that they were caused by a deviation from the
intended design rather than by features of the design itself.




87 See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J.
825, 837 (1973).
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Manufacturers are therefore not in any meaningful sense sub-
ject to a strict liability rule for design defects.88
The determination that a redesign is or is not a RAD is not
simply a comparison of the dollar cost of the added safety fea-
ture and the expected savings in accident costs.89 It is concep-
tually similar to the famous Hand formula for assessing the
defendant’s conduct under the negligence standard (B < PL),90
but the analysis of the costs to the manufacturer and the con-
sumer is structured by the factors in comment f to section 2 of
the Third Restatement.91 The economic cost of the redesign is
one factor, but more important is the impact of the redesign on
the utility the user receives from the product.92 For example,
safety guards and “deadman” switches on power tools are not all
that expensive to include with a product, but they interfere to
some extent with the usefulness of the product. Anyone who has
had to restart a lawnmower after letting go of the handle to re-
move a stick or rock has cursed that safety feature, but the ad-
ded safety resulting from inclusion of the deadman switch is
probably worth it, notwithstanding the hassle. A redesign may
yield additional safety, but if at some point the redesigned prod-
uct becomes a big enough headache for the user, a safety fea-
ture may not be a RAD.93 The comparison between the existing
design and the proposed redesign, to determine whether the
latter is a RAD, is undertaken from the point of view of the rea-
sonable person.94 Thus, all of the familiar issues in connection
with the negligence standard pertaining to the values and per-
spective of the reasonable person are fully applicable to the
analysis of a design defect.
It also matters whether the redesign does better at avoiding
the risk than a reasonably careful user. Although most states do
88 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a; David G. Owen,
Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the “Strict” Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L.
REV. 743, 785 (1996) (“the very idea that liability in these central contexts [of
design and warnings claims] is ‘strict’ has been viewed increasingly as a myth.”).
89 See generally David G. Owen, Toward a Proper Test for Design Defectiveness:
“Micro-Balancing” Costs and Benefits, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1661 (1997).
90 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). B
represents the burden of taking precautions, P stands for the probability of the
harm occurring, and L represents the severity of the injury—a party is liable
where B is less than P multiplied by L. Id.
91 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f.
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 See id. § 2 cmt. d.
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not use disappointment of consumer expectations as a stand-
alone test for design defect, expectations of users regarding the
product’s performance and the risks associated with its use may
be taken into account in determining whether a proposed rede-
sign is a RAD—that is, whether the existing design is defective.95
A hazard need not necessarily be designed out of a product if its
users are already aware of the risk and are in a better position
than the manufacturer to take precautions to avoid it.96 On the
flip side, evidence of user carelessness is not necessarily re-
stricted to consideration of the issue of comparative fault as an
affirmative defense. It could be the case that the manufacturer
should have foreseen certain careless behavior and redesigned
the product to make it safer in light of the risk produced by the
interaction of the product and foreseeably careless users.97 One
could say, for example, that users of hairdryers should be careful
not to use these products in the bathtub (obviously) or with
standing water on the floor (maybe less obvious). Nevertheless,
a hairdryer manufacturer that did not include the RAD of a
ground-fault circuit interrupt switch may be liable for a design
defect.98
This point is worth careful attention in connection with the
737 Max design because the MCAS system was designed as an
alternative to the usual approach of relying on training, crew
discipline, and basic airmanship.99 Recall that MCAS was in-
95 See id. § 2 cmt. g.
96 See id. § 2 reporters’ note cmt. a.
97 See id. § 2 cmt. p.
98 Would a warning be sufficient to avoid liability? (Everyone is familiar with
warning stickers on hairdryers cautioning against use near water.) This issue will
be discussed in more depth in connection with warnings below, but the short
answer is that if a RAD is available, the manufacturer may not warn its way out of
liability. See id. § 2 cmt. l, illus. 14. The longer answer is that determining whether
a redesign is a RAD may require considering the relative efficacy of a redesign
and enhanced warnings and instructions. See, e.g., Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v.
Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 335–37 (Tex. 1998).
99 There is no gender-neutral term in widespread use that captures the same
meaning as “airmanship,” defined by the FAA as:
[A] broad term that includes a sound knowledge of and experience
with the principles of flight, the knowledge, experience, and ability
to operate an airplane with competence and precision both on the
ground and in the air, and the application of sound judgment that
results in optimal operational safety and efficiency.
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AIRPLANE FLYING HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 1-1. Cogni-
tive psychologist James Reason uses the term “professionalism,” noting it is what
pilots refer to as airmanship, to denote “a capacity to see the broader picture, to
think ahead and to draw upon a wide range of knowledge and experience so as to
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tended to operate only when the flight crew had gotten into a
situation they probably should not be in, of a significant bank
angle during either a nose-high, relatively slow flight or a steep,
descending turn. The only intended effect of MCAS was to en-
sure that the angle of attack did not increase any further with an
addition of power. A well-trained crew could accomplish the
same goal with standardly trained, unusual attitude recovery
procedures.100 On the other hand, as shown by the Air France
447 and Colgan 3407 accidents, some professional crews have
revealed an alarming inability to recognize and recover from a
developing stall, even with the assistance of technology such as
flight directors and stick pushers and shakers.101 However, the
Air France and Colgan accidents are generally regarded in the
aviation community as the result of shocking incompetence.102
No airplane can be made impossible to crash by a crew deter-
mined to do its worst, and some risks are not worth it to design
out. Again, by “worth it,” the Third Restatement does not refer
to purely dollars-and-cents considerations. The question is, what
is the optimal mix of safety precautions, considering both tech-
nological solutions and reasonable care by human operators?
Importantly, even though potential user error is involved, the
foreseeability of human error is not only considered in connec-
tion with the affirmative defense of comparative fault but also
must be taken into account when considering whether a RAD is
perform demanding work safely, elegantly and effectively.” JAMES REASON, THE
HUMAN CONTRIBUTION: UNSAFE ACTS, ACCIDENTS AND HEROIC RECOVERIES 161
(2008).
100 As an aerodynamics textbook for pilots of airliners blandly states, “It is
highly unlikely that anyone with sufficient experience to be an airline captain
would inadvertently stall the aircraft.” JIM WEBB & BILLY WALKER, FLY THE WING 93
(Blackwell Publishing 3d ed. 2006) (1971).
101 See Nicola Clark, When Disaster Threatens, Instinct Can Be a Pilot’s Enemy, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/world/europe/
when-disaster-threatens-instinct-can-be-a-pilots-enemy.html [https://perma.cc/
4HNR-QMWW].
102 See id. But see generally PALMER, supra note 20, at 61–62 (making a case that
some aspects of the Airbus A330 flight control system and primary flight display
could have confused the crew). I am not aware of any claim that Colgan 3407 was
anything other than astonishingly poor airmanship by the crew. The late and
highly respected aviation writer Dick Collins provided a balanced overview of the
cause of the accident and the congressional response of mandating an air trans-
port pilot (ATP) certificate for airline first officers as well as captains. See Richard
Collins, A Double Tragedy: Colgan Air Flight 3407, AIR FACTS (Mar. 28, 2014),
https://airfactsjournal.com/2014/03/double-tragedy-colgan-air-flight-3407
[https://perma.cc/2922-W42C].
400 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [84
available that would mitigate the risk caused by foreseeable
carelessness.103
There is a certain irony in the 737 Max design. MCAS was
required to enhance the airplane’s longitudinal stability only in
corners of the flight envelope that a professional airline crew
should not be in at all. Thus, the presence of MCAS tacitly as-
sumes the foreseeability of pilot error in getting into an exces-
sively banked turn near the critical angle of attack. At the same
time, however, Boeing assessed the likelihood of a hazardous
condition caused by an inadvertent operation of MCAS as 1 in
223 trillion flight hours, and this estimate was based, in part, on
the assumption that pilots would recognize and correct a trim
runaway within three seconds.104 It therefore appears that MCAS
is a design feature intended to counteract the foreseeable
human error of ordinary pilots, but the assessment of the risk
posed by this design feature is based on the skill and perform-
ance that could be expected only from test pilots under con-
trolled conditions, not the chaos of a failure in the real world,
with the resulting cacophony of warning horns and stick
shakers.105
Another important aspect of the story of the 737 Max is that
Boeing may have been able to avoid what has become a fiasco
for the company by simply informing the operators of the air-
craft about the pitch-up tendency associated with the new en-
gines. The company was concerned, however, that requiring
extensive “differences training” for crews transitioning from the
NG to the Max would diminish the latter’s marketability.106 The
issue of whether Boeing’s silence about the presence of MCAS
constitutes a failure to warn will be considered below in section
III.B. It appears, however, that decision makers at the company
may have unnecessarily boxed themselves in by committing to
make the Max fly as much like the NG as possible.107 If the com-
pany had frankly informed airline purchasers that the Max had
slightly different handling characteristics that needed to be
103 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmts. a, f.
104 See Gates & Baker, supra note 23.
105 See id.
106 See id. “Differences training” is the term used for required training for pilots
who already hold a type rating on an aircraft and are transitioning to a variant of
that aircraft. See David Learmount, ‘Differences Training’ Under Scrutiny After 737
Max Crashes, FLIGHTGLOBAL (May 24, 2019), https://www.flightglobal.com/
news/articles/analysis-differences-training-under-scrutiny-afte-458276 [https://
perma.cc/9XD9-S8EJ].
107 See Learmount, supra note 106.
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taken into account by flight crews, it may not have needed this
modification to the aircraft’s control laws. Boeing apparently as-
sumed that a crew someplace would eventually screw up and
stall the redesigned 737, choosing to adopt the technological
solution of MCAS operating in the background without disclo-
sure to airlines.
2. Design Issues in the 737 Max as Delivered
The optimal balance of reliance on human care and auto-
mated solutions to human carelessness is very much an open
question in products liability law. It will be faced again, not only
in aviation but also in contexts such as semiautonomous vehi-
cles, which still require some driver monitoring. Section IV of
this Article will return to this interesting and subtle problem.
The analysis of Boeing’s liability for the 737 Max design can
avoid some of those deep conceptual issues, however, because
some of its design decisions are difficult to defend in hind-
sight.108 The good news for Boeing is that these design flaws can
be corrected and the 737 Max returned to service. The bad
news, of course, is that it is exposed to significant liability judg-
ments stemming from the Ethiopian Airlines 302 and Lion Air
610 accidents.
a. Relying on One of Two AOA Sensors
It is a fundamental principle of aircraft design, and of engi-
neering generally, that single points of failure are to be avoided
whenever possible.109 The design of the MCAS system took AOA
data from only one of two available sensors.110 As a result, if one
108 Cf. Jon Ostrower, Boeing Details Changes to MCAS and Training for 737 Max,
AIR CURRENT (Mar. 27, 2019), https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/boeing-
details-changes-to-mcas-for-737-max/ [https://perma.cc/JS4B-HHB8].
109 See Chris Woodyard, Boeing’s ‘Single Point Failure’: Why Was There No Backup
System on 737 Max Jet?, USA TODAY (Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2019/04/06/boeings-737-max-8-jet-mystery-why-there-no-
backup-system/3378703002/ [https://perma.cc/FM73-YFMR].
110 See Nicas et al., Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions Into 737 MAX, supra note 26.
That article also reports that MCAS initially was designed to trigger only in cer-
tain high-speed, accelerated maneuvers. Id. It therefore relied on two data
points—AOA and acceleration (G-force). Id. Once MCAS was adapted to prevent
stalls in a different flight regime, e.g., of slow, climbing flight, the G-force trigger
was removed from MCAS, leaving only the single AOA sensor as the source of
data. Id. Software engineer and pilot Gregory Travis raises the interesting point
that an additional source of AOA data is the eyeballs of the flying pilot, who can
look at outside visual references (or at the attitude indicator during instrument
flight conditions) and verify that the airplane’s pitch attitude is not excessively
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sensor fed erroneous data to the flight-control system, the com-
puter might react in a way the crew did not anticipate. Under
the Third Restatement design-defect analysis, a plaintiff suing
Boeing for losses resulting from the Lion Air 610 or Ethiopian
Airlines 302 accidents would have the burden of establishing
that relying on AOA data from both sensors was a RAD. The
sensor is already there, so the economic cost is practically
zero.111 The risks presented by relying on only one sensor are
entirely foreseeable.112 A bird strike could disable a sensor (as is
believed to have occurred to Ethiopian 302), it could be affected
by ice or other weather conditions (the beginning of the acci-
dent chain of Air France 447), or the sensor could malfunction
for other reasons.113 Other factors in the design-defect analysis
are the effect of the redesign on the utility of the product.114 For
example, the reliance on two sensors creates the possibility of
mismatches between the left- and right-side AOA indications.
This seems like it might happen, but it could be addressed by
requiring agreement between the two before the AOA protec-
tions of MCAS will kick in. An additional disutility is the require-
ment of replacing or repairing a faulty sensor. Boeing wanted to
keep the system as simple as possible so that its airline customer
would not be forced to ground a plane for required mainte-
nance if it would still be safe to operate it with one AOA
sensor.115
high. See Travis, supra note 22. The pilot should properly be considered part of
the system maintaining a safe AOA, but MCAS by design takes the pilot out of the
system. See id.
111 Cf. Gates & Baker, supra note 23.
112 For example, a similar problem, although in this case with one of two radio
altimeters instead of AOA sensors, was the initial cause that started the chain of
events leading to the crash of Turkish Airlines Flight 1951. See DUTCH SAFETY BD.,
CRASHED DURING APPROACH, BOEING 737-800, NEAR AMSTERDAM SCHIPHOL AIR-
PORT, 25 FEBRUARY 2009, at 48 (May 2010), https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/
page/1182/turkish-airlines-crashed-during-approach-boeing-737-800-amsterdam
[https://perma.cc/Y3T8-A6L5].
113 See, e.g., Alan Levin & Ryan Beene, Sensors Linked to Boeing 737 Crashes Vul-
nerable to Failure, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2019-04-11/sensors-linked-to-737-crashes-vulnerable-to-failure-
data-show [https://perma.cc/AB6K-KGDN].
114 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
115 See Gates & Baker, supra note 23; Alison Sider & Andy Pasztor, Boeing Official
Played Down Scenario that May Have Doomed Ethiopian Jet, WALL ST. J. (May 21,
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-official-played-down-scenario-that-
may-have-doomed-ethiopian-jet-11558439651 [https://perma.cc/M5WK-Z6PX].
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Alternatively, or in addition, the flight crew should be warned
when the two AOA sensors do not agree with each other. In fact,
Boeing had already designed in the capability of alerting flight
crews to a disagreement among AOA sensors but decided that
this indication would be enabled only for customers who had
purchased the optional feature of an AOA indication on the pri-
mary flight display.116 Some reporting has made this sound like
a cover-up by Boeing or an effort to squeeze more money out of
purchasers by charging for an optional feature that should have
been made part of the baseline product.117 However, most civil-
ian aircraft do not display AOA directly even though the data
are used by the flight management computer.118 Flight crews
would have to be trained to interpret AOA indications and inte-
grate that information into their scan, which already includes
airspeed, glidepath, and lateral guidance. In an attention-get-
ting scenario like a sudden pitch down, the instinct of most air-
line pilots would not be to take a look at indicated AOA but to
116 See Jamie Freed & Eric M. Johnson, Optional Warning Light Could Have Aided




117 See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi & David Gelles, Doomed Boeing Jets Lacked 2 Safety
Features that Company Sold Only as Extras, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/business/boeing-safety-features-charge.html
[https://perma.cc/FU4X-DYX] (“As the pilots of the doomed Boeing jets in
Ethiopia and Indonesia fought to control their planes, they lacked two notable
safety features in their cockpits. One reason: Boeing charged extra for them.”);
Nick Zazulia, Boeing Knew the AOA Disagree Alert on the 737 MAX Didn’t Work—And
Said Nothing, AVIATION TODAY (May 6, 2019), https://www.aviationtoday.com/
2019/05/06/boeing-angle-of-attack-disagree-alert/ [https://perma.cc/2JB3-
LL3U].
118 A Boeing publication notes:
AOA can be used for many indications on the flight deck to im-
prove flight crew awareness of airplane state relative to perform-
ance limits. Dedicated AOA indicators have been used on military
aircraft for many years, but this form of display has not been used
often on commercial airplanes. On Boeing models currently in pro-
duction, AOA is used to drive stall warning (stick shaker), stall mar-
gin information on airspeed indicators, and the pitch limit
indicator (PLI) on the primary attitude displays. AOA information
is combined with other data and displayed as an integral part of
flight deck displays.
John E. Cashman et al., Operational Use of Angle of Attack on Modern Commercial Jet
Airplanes, AERO, Oct. 2000, at 10, 12, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aer-
omagazine/aero_12/aoa.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNE5-HWFM].
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pull back to establish the desired pitch attitude, looking at ei-
ther the attitude indicator or external visual references.
Boeing’s decision to make an AOA display available as an op-
tion makes sense, not from the point of view of corporate greed,
but as rightly deferring a risk–utility decision to purchasers. An
airline’s flight operations and training departments would have
to reach a considered decision about whether to integrate AOA
information into standardized procedures. An interesting wrin-
kle in the design-defect analysis using the risk–utility test is that
there may be two versions of a product—call them Option A
and Option B—one of which includes a safety feature that may
be omitted under certain circumstances without unreasonably
reducing the safety aspects of the product. Option B is not a
RAD for Option A, or vice versa, as long as the purchaser is
aware of the optional safety feature and knowledgeable about
the risk–utility trade-offs involving it.119 Again, the dollar cost of
the safety feature is not by itself dispositive of the risk–utility
analysis. In a well-known case, a state police department pur-
chased bulletproof vests that offered less than full coverage for
users’ bodies.120 It did so not to save money but because troop-
ers preferred vests that were cooler and offered more freedom
of movement.121 The full-coverage vest was available as an op-
tion, but it was not a RAD for the model purchased by the state
police.122 Similarly, the lack of a direct indication of AOA is not
a design defect even though an option to display AOA is
available.
However, Boeing’s silence about the presence and operation
of MCAS should be considered in conjunction with a variation
on this theory of liability. Some reporting on the 737 Max has
focused on the absence of a warning that the two AOA sensors
are disagreeing with each other.123 The trouble is, even if the
119 See, e.g., Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 679, 681–83
(N.Y. 1999) (school bus is not defective in design for lack of an audible backup
alert because there are circumstances—including the purchaser’s situation of op-
erating a crowded bus yard in a residential neighborhood—in which the safety
feature’s disutility would outweigh its utility).
120 Linegar v. Armour of Am., Inc., 909 F.2d 1150, 1151 (8th Cir. 1990). This
case is the basis for illustration 10 to section 2 of the Third Restatement on
risk–utility analysis. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f,
illus. 10 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
121 See Linegar, 909 F.2d at 1154–55.
122 See id.
123 See, e.g., Tripti Lahiri, Boeing Has a Puzzling Explanation for Why a
“Standalone” Warning Signal Didn’t Work, QUARTZ (Apr. 30, 2019), https://
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crew received an “AOA Disagree” warning, the significance of
that warning would not be apparent unless they had also been
told that a sudden change in pitch trim might be commanded
by a flight control law based on indications of a high AOA. Boe-
ing recently (and correctly) stated in a press release:
Air speed, attitude, altitude, vertical speed, heading and engine
power settings are the primary parameters the flight crews use to
safely operate the airplane in normal flight. Stick shaker and the
pitch limit indicator are the primary features used for the opera-
tion of the airplane at elevated angles of attack. All recom-
mended pilot actions, checklists, and training are based upon
these primary indicators. Neither the angle of attack indicator
nor the AOA Disagree alert are necessary for the safe operation
of the airplane. They provide supplemental information only,
and have never been considered safety features on commercial
jet transport airplanes.124
Airline crews are trained to rely on airspeed, attitude, power set-
ting, etc., rather than angle of attack. Thus, an AOA Disagree
indication would not by itself convey the information that some-
thing having an immediate impact on the safe operation of the
aircraft was possible. The alert would be significant only in the
context of previous training about the existence of MCAS, which
Boeing sought to avoid.
Again, the company painted itself into a corner by trying to
design the Max to fly like the NG while also seeking to circum-
vent the requirement of differences training for crews transi-
tioning to the Max. Now that every pilot in the world has heard
of MCAS, the AOA Disagree alert is much more meaningful,
and it should be a required feature of the design of the aircraft.
It will continue to be important, however, for the company to
think about a way to make the warning salient and trigger the
right reaction. Over-warning and unhelpful presentation of
warnings are already well-recognized problems in flight deck de-
qz.com/1608362/boeing-says-it-didnt-deactivate-standalone-aoa-safety-alert
[https://perma.cc/LKZ7-NLPK].
124 Press Release, Boeing, Boeing Statement on AOA Disagree Alert (May 5,
2019), https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=130431
[https://perma.cc/N9F5-SJJ5]. Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg has insisted—
rightly, I believe—in public comments that the AOA Disagree alert is an issue
separate from MCAS. See Joe Anselmo & Graham Warwick, Boeing Chief Dennis
Muilenburg Talks MAX, NMA, 777X and Automation, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.
(June 14, 2019), http://aviationweek.com/paris-airshow-2019/boeing-chief-den-
nis-muilenburg-talks-max-nma-777x-and-automation [https://perma.cc/7UBU-
N3SL].
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sign, and pilots attempting to sort through a barrage of warn-
ings take the wrong corrective action in many cases.125
b. Aggressive and Repeated Trim Inputs
A design change during the development of MCAS made the
system much more assertive. While earlier versions had the capa-
bility of changing the stabilizer trim angle by a maximum of 0.6
degrees in 10 seconds, the system was subsequently redesigned
to allow trim changes of up to 2.5 degrees in 10 seconds.126
What is worse, on previous 737 aircraft, pulling back against a
nose-down trim input would have had the effect of stopping the
trim.127 It is a natural reaction to pull back in response to an
unexpected pitch down, but MCAS fought that reaction by ag-
gressively reasserting the nose-down trim input.128 The much
stronger, more assertive version of MCAS on the Ethiopian Air-
lines and Lion Air aircraft seems obviously defective in design,
but Boeing may have an argument to raise in defense of its engi-
neering decisions.
Descriptions of the Ethiopian Airlines crew battling against
MCAS run amok sound like a real-world version of HAL, the
murderous computer in 2001: A Space Odyssey. The flying pilot
was pulling back on the control yoke and trying to trim nose-up.
Why would the flight control system not let him? It seems per-
verse to incorporate flight control laws that run counter to in-
stinctive inputs on the controls by pilots. One must keep in
mind, however, that Boeing designed the 737 Max flight control
system after accidents such as Air France 447, in which the flying
pilot incorrectly (and inexplicably) held the stick full back in a
deep stall for over three minutes.129 The determined nose-down
125 See SIDNEY W.A. DEKKER, TEN QUESTIONS ABOUT HUMAN ERROR: A NEW VIEW
OF HUMAN FACTORS AND SYSTEM SAFETY 152–54 (2005).
126 See Nicas et al., Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions into 737 MAX, supra note 26.
127 See Gates & Baker, supra note 23. Accident investigator and Boeing 777 cap-
tain Shem Malmquist writes:
It is standard in the Boeing aircraft that the stabilizer trim can be
stopped by moving the control column in the opposite direction.
Aircraft designers assume that no pilot would intentionally trim the
aircraft nose up while also pushing forward on the controls to pitch
the aircraft down or vice versa.
Shem Malmquist, The AOA Problem – What We Can Do About It, AIRLINE SAFETY
BLOG (Nov. 19, 2018), https://airlinesafety.blog/2018/11/19/the-aoa-problem-
what-we-can-do-about-it/ [https://perma.cc/NT95-M553].
128 See Gates & Baker, supra note 23.
129 See WEBB & WALKER, supra note 100, at 99 (“It would be absolutely unthink-
able for a pilot to pull back on the elevator from an extreme stalled attitude”).
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inputs made by MCAS were a feature, not a bug, of the system,
relative to the foreseeable risk created by the human–machine
interaction.130 Previous accidents had shown that even profes-
sional flight crews do the wrong thing—perhaps due to psycho-
logical effects, such as the startle reflex and narrowing of focus,
or perhaps due to a lack of training in high-altitude stall recog-
nition and recovery. From the point of view of Boeing engi-
neers, the foreseeable risk to be taken into account when
designing the flight-control system of the 737 Max included the
risk that pilots will fight existing stall-prevention systems, includ-
ing stall warnings, stick shakers, and stick pushers.
The Third Restatement design-defect analysis is a risk–utility
test. That means the assessment of whether there is a design de-
fect related to MCAS depends to a significant extent on a pre-
cise specification of the risk the design is intended to prevent or
mitigate. A systems approach to this analysis sees the risk as a
property of the interaction between airplanes and flight crews in
the aggregate. Arguably the feature of aggressive, repeated nose-
down trim inputs was not a mistake made by the designers of the
system but a response to prior accidents—and also to the fact
that an increasing number of jetliners were being purchased
and operated in the developing world. While airlines in many
developed countries have long relied on the military and a ro-
bust civil aviation sector to provide basic training to pilots, there
is a much smaller pool of already trained pilots in many parts of
the developing world.131 Boeing and its major competitor Airbus
130 See Travis, supra note 22 (observing that “not letting the pilot regain control
by pulling back on the column was an explicit design decision.”).
131 It is important not to overgeneralize the training and competence of flight
crews in the developing world. The captain of Ethiopian Airlines 302 was a high-
time pilot and, by all accounts, a very proficient aviator. See Maggie Fick, Youngest
Captain, Loving Son: Ethiopian Pilots Honored in Death, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-pilots/youngest-captain-
loving-son-ethiopian-pilots-honored-in-death-idUSKCN1R11LV [https://
perma.cc/7VYP-554G]. However, his first officer is reported to have had only
about 200 hours of total flying time, which is astonishingly low. See Christine
Negroni, Ethiopian Airlines, with a Tradition of Training Pilots, Wants to Become Af-
rica’s Leading Carrier, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/03/12/business/ethiopian-airline-crash-school.html [https://perma.cc/
2RW5-KSGB]. Air France is a major Western European carrier that draws pilots
from the French Air Force as well as the civilian aviation sector, but it exper-
ienced one of the most egregious incidents of pilot error in recent years. The
pilot flying at the time of the crash of Air France 447 was a relatively inexperi-
enced relief pilot, but the captain and first officer had significant flying experi-
ence. See Langewiesche, The Human Factor, supra note 20. What can be said in
general, however, is that commercial airliner manufacturers are operating under
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have made determined efforts to sell more aircraft in countries
like Indonesia that are experiencing a booming demand for air
travel but which are behind North America and Western Europe
in producing trained flight crews.132 Increasing reliance on auto-
mation to mitigate risks associated with deficient airmanship is a
strategy employed across aviation generally. Ironically, however,
Boeing considered the likelihood of a prompt, correct response
to a trim runaway as one of the safeguards protecting against the
possibility of an accident caused by an inadvertent MCAS opera-
tion.133 Boeing’s risk–utility analysis may have been hampered
by these two inconsistent mindsets regarding the possibility of
crew error. MCAS was designed to reduce the likelihood of acci-
dents caused by poor airmanship, but Boeing’s evaluation of the
expected accident costs of the system depended on unrealistic
assumptions about the performance of the average airline crew.
It makes no sense to think about the risk–utility balance of a
product as designed—for example, the 737 Max with MCAS—
without taking into account what is known about users of the
product, their expectations of its performance, their training
and experience, and the types of errors to which they are sus-
ceptible. However, the interaction between user performance
and product safety goes both ways. It is clear that a product can
incorporate safety features that mitigate risks created by foresee-
able user errors. Pilots may sometimes get slow and too close to
the stall margin; a rattle from the stick shaker will prevent the
situation from developing into an actual loss of control. Perhaps
less obviously, the presence of a safety feature may lead to com-
placency or inattention by users or erosion of user skills, which
may increase the likelihood of a different type of risk.134 This is
the assumption that a growth area in their industry will be in parts of the world in
which aircrew training standards, in the aggregate, are not what they are in the
developed world.
132 See Eric Lipton et al., Diplomats Help Push Sales of Jetliners on the Global Market,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/business/
03wikileaks-boeing.html [https://perma.cc/PV99-FZM6].
133 See Gates & Baker, supra note 23; Nicas et al., Boeing Built Deadly Assumptions
into 737 MAX, supra note 26 (quoting a Boeing vice president as telling a meeting
of American Airlines pilots that MCAS is not a single point of failure system be-
cause “the function and the trained pilot work side by side and are part of the
system”).
134 American Airlines training captain Warren VanderBurgh coined the term
“Children of the Magenta Line” to describe automation-dependent pilots who
had, mostly at the urging of airline training departments, become overly depen-
dent on automation. See Editorial, How to End Automation Dependency, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH. (July 19, 2013), http://aviationweek.com/commercial-avia-
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the phenomenon of systems accidents, in which the dynamic in-
teraction between the safety features designed into a complex
product and the experience of users over time with the product
combine in unpredictable ways, complicating the manufac-
turer’s risk–utility analysis.
A notorious accident illustrating this interaction between
technology and human error is the crash of Asiana Flight 214 at
San Francisco International Airport on July 6, 2013.135 The flight
crew was preoccupied with getting the aircraft down on the
proper glidepath, using the flight management system for an
automated approach, and failed to notice an alarming decrease
in airspeed; the airplane crashed into the seawall short of the
runway.136 Significantly, the weather could not have been more
benign and would have been suitable for a hand-flown ap-
proach.137 The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
found that most Asiana crews did not hand-fly above 1,000 feet
on approach and landing.138 The airline “emphasized the full
use of all automation and did not encourage manual flight dur-
ing line operations.”139 As a result, there is a risk that pilots will
become rusty in basic skills:
By manually flying only the last 1,000 ft of an approach, pilots do
not get to experience the necessary control inputs and feedback
performance of the airplane that takes place in climbs, descents,
turns, accelerations, decelerations, and configuration changes
and do not develop or maintain an ability to “stay ahead” of the
airplane, meaning the ability to anticipate the airplane’s
performance.140
The airline encouraged the use of automation because it be-
lieved it would increase safety, and in many respects, it probably
did. But it led to the unintended consequences of eroding the
tion/editorial-how-end-automation-dependency [https://perma.cc/4JM5-BSVU]
(citing Captain VanderBurgh’s “famous lecture” on the paradox of automation);
see also Chuck Cali, Masters of the Magenta – The Real Story, AIR FACTS (July 13,
2016), https://airfactsjournal.com/2016/07/masters-of-the-magenta/ [https://
perma.cc/G5KY-MVA8].
135 See generally NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/AAR-14/01, ACCIDENT RE-
PORT: DESCENT BELOW VISUAL GLIDEPATH AND IMPACT WITH SEAWALL, ASIANA AIR-
LINES FLIGHT 214, BOEING 777-200ER, HL7742, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, JULY
6, 2013 (2014), https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/55000-55499/55433/563979.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GYG5-ZNL7] [hereinafter ASIANA 214 REPORT].
136 See id. at xi–xii.
137 See id. at 30.
138 Id. at 62–63.
139 Id. at 102.
140 Id. at 104.
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ability of pilots to recognize and recover from an unstable
situation.141
A dissenting member of the NTSB referred to Asiana 214 as a
systems accident.142 It is true that the crew failed to monitor air-
speed, but that is because they had come to rely on the air-
plane’s automation to provide airspeed control. As the dissenter
argued, “insufficient flight crew monitoring of airspeed during
the approach resulted, in part, from expectancy, increased wor-
kload, and automation overreliance.”143 In other words, a nar-
row causal focus on flight-crew error would fail to pick up the
contributing factor of reliance on automation that led to the
laxness in monitoring airspeed. Granted, the flying pilot misun-
derstood the operation of the autothrottles in the automation
mode he had selected in order to expedite the descent, and
granted, he and other crew members failed to keep a close eye
on airspeed throughout the approach.144 These are mistakes,
and serious ones, but the crucial insight of systems thinking is
these are not independent of the existence of automation and
the foreseeable effect of automation usage on human skill and
performance. The considerable safety advantages offered by
flight deck automation may have the seemingly perverse but en-
tirely foreseeable result of increasing the likelihood and gravity
of other types of risks.
Evaluation of the 737 Max design is therefore not a simple
matter of approving or disapproving of increasing levels of auto-
mation. There are feedback effects that must be taken into ac-
count. Without MCAS, a crew might have gotten slow in a
climbing turn, added power without sufficient offsetting forward
pressure on the yoke, and stalled the airplane as a result. The
addition of MCAS mitigated that stall risk but created a new
source of potential trim runaways. Mitigating that increased trim
risk might have been a simple matter of retaining the behavior
of the 737 NG, in which pulling back would stop nose-down
trim. But the Air France 447 and Colgan 3407 accidents showed
141 The NTSB observed that the FAA has “acknowledged that autoflight sys-
tems are useful tools for pilots and have improved safety and workload manage-
ment but cautioned that continuous use of autoflight systems could lead to
degradation of the pilot’s ability to quickly recover the aircraft from an undesired
state.” Id. at 74.
142 Id. at 139 (NTSB member Robert L. Sumwalt concurring in part and dis-
senting in part, statement filed on July 1, 2014).
143 Id.
144 See id. at 126 (report’s findings).
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that crews confronted by a sudden unexpected anomaly might
react inappropriately by fighting the automated systems that al-
ready existed to prevent a stall. Something more intrusive and
aggressive might be needed to mitigate the risk of resisting auto-
mated systems, but a system that intervenes too vigorously cre-
ates its own characteristic risks—those that manifested in the
Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian Airlines 302 accidents. The 737 Max
will eventually return to service with a kinder, gentler MCAS.
Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg has publicly committed to
modifications including a single activation of MCAS, not a re-
peated activation that will fight repeated control inputs by the
flight crew.145 In effect, this is a design change that restores
some of the traditional trust placed by manufacturers in the
competence of pilots.
One hopes that there will not be an accident in the future
that could have been prevented by the older, more aggressive
MCAS.146 However, the interaction between human error and
the technological means of mitigating it is dynamic and unpre-
dictable. The analysis of design defect needs to take this interac-
tion into account. The right approach is not blind deference to
manufacturers’ risk–utility calculations but appreciation of the
challenge of employing technological solutions to human error,
which themselves can lead to new types of errors.
3. Relevance of FAA Approval of the Max Design
A great deal of reporting in the popular media has focused on
the seemingly cozy relationship between Boeing and the FAA,
145 See Anselmo & Warwick, supra note 124; Scott McCartney, Inside the Effort to
Fix the Troubled Boeing 737 MAX, WALL ST. J. (June 5, 2019), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/testing-the-fix-for-the-troubled-737-max-11559772634
[https://perma.cc/8UTB-AHT2].
146 Jeff Rachlinski suggested to me the possibility that Boeing may be “damned
if it does, damned if it doesn’t”—i.e., that it may be liable in an accident scenario
in which a less-intrusive version of MCAS failed to override the incorrect control
inputs of the flight crew—shows that liability may in fact be strict for certain
products. He mentioned Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 957–59, 962 (3d
Cir. 1980), in which a car manufacturer was held liable for a design that incorpo-
rated insufficient side-impact protection, even though the reason was to provide
additional protection against the much more common scenario of a rear-impact
collision. Is liability not strict in this case, if the jury is permitted to find the
manufacturer liable even though it made the right risk–utility tradeoff, taking
into account both side and rear impacts? The answer, I think, is that Dawson
should be seen as a cautionary tale, and that courts should be somewhat reluctant
to send cases to juries, or to allow jury verdicts to stand, where this type of iter-
ated liability is a substantial possibility.
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which is responsible for certifying aircraft designs as airwor-
thy.147 Unsurprisingly, the regulations defining the require-
ments for certification are complex and require the submission
of reams of engineering data.148 It is unrealistic to believe that a
federal agency could afford to attract and retain engineering
staff in all of the subdisciplines required to evaluate the compli-
ance of a design with airworthiness standards. The FAA there-
fore recognizes Designated Engineering Representatives (DER),
who may be employed by the manufacturer, to approve techni-
cal data on behalf of the FAA.149 In general, conformity with
federal or state safety regulations is not a defense to a design or
warnings claim.150 Compliance is some evidence that can be
taken into account by the trier of fact, but it is not dispositive of
the issue.151 This is different from a defense based on preemp-
tion of state common law standards by federal regulations, al-
though the arguments could be raised at the same time in a
suitable case.152 It reflects the traditional view that government-
mandated standards are only a floor of safety, and that courts
147 See, e.g., Dominic Gates, Flawed Analysis, Failed Oversight: How Boeing, FAA
Certified the Suspect 737 MAX Flight Control System, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-
faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash
[https://perma.cc/VM4M-SKJR]; Natalie Kitroeff et al., The Roots of Boeing’s 737
Max Crisis: A Regulator Relaxes Its Oversight, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/07/27/business/boeing-737-max-faa.html [https://
perma.cc/8M47-7YES]. It should be noted that the same issue would arise for a
design certified by Airbus, Embraer, or Bombardier. There is nothing specific to
Boeing’s relationship with the FAA, as opposed to the certification process in
general, that is suspicious. See Kitroeff et al., supra.
148 Aircraft Certification, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/licenses_
certificates/aircraft_certification/ [https://perma.cc/TRM7-JY9H] (last modi-
fied May 23, 2019).
149 See 14 C.F.R. § 183.29 (1989); see also Fed. Aviation Admin., Order
8110.37F, Designated Engineering Representative Handbook 2-1–2-9 (2017),
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/FAA_Order_8110.37F.
pdf [https://perma.cc/3XGL-2XQB].
150 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4(b) (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
151 See id.
152 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 559–73 (2009) (failure-to-warn prod-
ucts liability case considering both compliance with regulatory standards and fed-
eral preemption); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1332 (Or. 1978)
(Linde, J., concurring) (explaining the difference between these doctrines); see
also Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2053–60
(2000) (distinguishing the analytically similar but distinct doctrines of preemp-
tion and regulatory compliance).
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may apply the common law defect standard in a way that re-
quires manufacturers to do more than the minimum.
In some cases, however, the trial court may conclude that a
regulatory standard is both a floor and a ceiling—that is, that
the regulator got it just right, so that a product in compliance
with the regulation should be deemed non-defective as a matter
of law. As a comment to the Third Restatement emphasizes,
however, this should be an unusual occurrence:
Such a conclusion may be appropriate when the safety statute or
regulation was promulgated recently, thus supplying currency to
the standard therein established; when the specific standard ad-
dresses the very issue of product design or warning presented in
the case before the court; and when the court is confident that
the deliberative process by which the safety standard was estab-
lished was full, fair, and thorough and reflected substantial
expertise.153
The argument for a regulatory compliance defense would be,
quite simply, considerations of comparative institutional compe-
tence.154 Who is more likely to know whether the risk of an inad-
vertent MCAS deployment is adequately mitigated by existing
flight-crew training in dealing with trim runaways—the FAA or a
jury applying the design-defect and RAD standard? In the simi-
larly complex field of toxic torts, involving issues of medicine,
pharmacology, and epidemiology, courts have gotten it badly
wrong in cases involving products such as the anti-morning-sick-
ness pill Bendectin and silicone breast implants.155 But of course
one can also cite numerous examples of capture of regulatory
agencies by powerful actors in the industries they regulate.156
The backstop of potential tort liability is necessary to ensure that
manufacturers cannot lobby or use the revolving door of em-
153 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4 cmt. e. The Restatement
comment does not mention another consideration that may be the most signifi-
cant—namely, whether the regulation was aimed at establishing a minimum stan-
dard or striking the optimal risk–benefit analysis. See Richard B. Stewart,
Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort Liability: Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88
GEO. L.J. 2167, 2173 (2000).
154 See, e.g., Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 334–35 (1985); W. Kip Viscusi et
al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale for the FDA
Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1437, 1447–48 (1994).
155 See Rabin, supra note 152, at 2061–64.
156 See Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products
Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1147–52 (1988).
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ployment between industry and government to beat back safety
regulations that would prove too costly.
In the case of the 737 Max, there is considerable evidence
suggesting not invidious corruption or even regulatory capture;
rather, the FAA was simply overwhelmed by the task of reviewing
the design of complex aircraft systems and had little choice but
to defer to Boeing engineers.157 The DER system is premised on
the inability of the FAA to attract and retain qualified engineers
in all of the subdisciplines involved in certifying a transport-cate-
gory jetliner—engines, electronics, flight analysis, structural,
and systems and equipment engineering.158 The sometimes
maligned dual-track system, in which manufacturers must obtain
government approval and then face the possibility of ex post scru-
tiny of their design decisions by juries in the wake of an acci-
dent, may actually be functional in a context in which the
regulator will inevitably be outmatched by the resources availa-
ble to the manufacturer. Incentives to “pencil whip” test data or
otherwise take shortcuts in the regulatory compliance process
are mitigated by the possibility that documents revealed in dis-
covery in a civil lawsuit could expose decisions that would be
difficult to defend before a jury. Criticism of the civil jury system
for lack of expertise are mostly well-taken, but conducting the
certification process in the shadow of potential jury adjudication
may not be a bad second-best system, in comparison with the
hypothetical (but unattainable) system in which a regulator like
the FAA had access to all the engineering talent that would be
required to make reliable risk–benefit determinations. In any
event, Boeing’s assertion of a regulatory compliance defense will
almost certainly be unsuccessful in light of the evidence of the
departure of the process from the ideal of a “full, fair, and thor-
ough” consideration.159
B. INFORMATION DEFECTS: INADEQUATE WARNINGS AND
INSTRUCTIONS
The information-defect standard of the Third Restatement is
unabashedly a negligence rule.160 The manufacturer is liable if
157 See Gates & Baker, supra note 23; Kitroeff et al., supra note 147.
158 See Fed. Aviation Admin., Designated Engineering Representative Hand-
book, supra note 149, at 2-1.
159 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
160 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Prod-
ucts Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 269–70
(1990).
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the foreseeable risks of a product “could have been reduced or
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warn-
ings.”161 The reasonableness standard asks simply whether the
information provided by the manufacturer was adequate to in-
form a user of the nature of an unknown hazard and the means
available to avoid or mitigate that risk.162 No warning need be
given if the danger would be open and obvious to a reasonable
user,163 but no one could seriously contend that pilots would
know of the presence of a flight control law that is supposed to
operate in the background. The issue in the litigation will there-
fore be whether a reasonable manufacturer would have pro-
vided information about the presence of MCAS operating in the
background as part of the 737 Max flight control laws. As we will
see, the systems approach to accidents involving the interaction
between users and product safety features is inescapable in the
analysis of failure-to-warn claims.
1. Interaction Between Warnings and Design Analysis
Assume a risk associated with the interaction between a prod-
uct and its users. Now assume there are two options for reducing
that risk: redesigning the product to incorporate a safety feature
or giving warnings to users about the risk and information on
how to avoid it. In a frequently cited case, a city sanitation
worker lost a foot to the powerful hydraulic press on the back of
a garbage truck.164 The manufacturer argued that obviousness
was an implicit warning about the danger of getting the user’s
foot caught in the press.165 However, the plaintiff pointed out
that several redesigns were available that would have kept the
user’s foot at a safe distance from the press when it was operat-
ing (for example, a switch might have been located at a suffi-
cient distance from the press that it would be impossible to get
too close to it).166 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
wrote:
An adequate warning may reduce the likelihood of injury to the
user of a product in some cases. We decline, however, to adopt
any rule which permits a manufacturer or designer to discharge
161 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(c) (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
162 See id. § 2 cmt. i.
163 Id. § 2 cmt. j.
164 Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1189 (Mass. 1978).
165 Id. at 1191.
166 See id.
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its total responsibility to workers by simply warning of the dan-
gers of a product. . . .
. . . .
. . . If a slight change in design would prevent serious, perhaps
fatal, injury, the designer may not avoid liability by simply warn-
ing of the possible injury.167
This case appears to state a clear priority principle, i.e., that de-
sign changes are required before warnings will serve to avoid the
manufacturer’s liability. But notice an important qualification
on that rule lurking in the passage quoted above—“[i]f a slight
change in design would prevent serious . . . injury.”168 It may be
the case that avoiding or mitigating a risk would require an ex-
tensive design change or at least one that is greater than “slight.”
The best way to understand the priority principle is that if a
RAD is available, the manufacturer must adopt it and may not
simply warn its way out of liability. The tricky aspect of this way
of understanding the interaction between design and warnings
is that the possibility of eliminating or reducing the risk with a
suitable warning is itself a factor in the analysis of whether a
redesign is a RAD.169 Putting it in terms made prominent by
Guido Calabresi, who is the cheaper cost-avoider: (1) the manu-
facturer, by means of a redesign; or (2) a suitably well-informed
user?170 It could be the case that additional safety features are
not as effective as relying on the exercise of reasonable care by
users. In that case, the proposed redesign would not be a RAD.
An important refinement on the Calabresi analysis, as applied to
products liability, is that the costs to be avoided include the disu-
tility to users of the redesign.171 It is possible to imagine all kinds
of redesigns that increase safety but at an unacceptable cost in
terms of reducing the utility of the product to its users. A BB
gun, for example, could be made safer by shooting only soft pro-
jectiles, not metal balls, but then it would be a lot less fun. A
reasonable balance between manufacturer and user responsibil-
ity might therefore be to require the manufacturer to warn users
to wear eye protection (if that risk is not open and obvious) but
to allow it to continue using the design that shoots metal balls.
167 Id. at 1192.
168 See id.
169 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
170 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 244–65 (1970).
171 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f.
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The MCAS design feature was intended to mitigate a risk that
was introduced by the manufacturer into the design of the 737
Max.172 It is important not to read the priority principle as nec-
essarily mandating a design change in this case. It may have been
sufficient to provide a reasonable warning of the slightly in-
creased risk of an inadvertent stall created by the size and place-
ment of the engines on the Max, as distinct from the 737 NG.
(Boeing may now wish it had done just that). Determining
whether some design change like MCAS is required takes the
analysis back to the concept of the RAD. Boeing had to deter-
mine ex ante whether the 737 Max would have a design defect
related to the placement of the engines and thus an increased
likelihood of a stall in certain flight regimes. Doing so requires
thinking about the possibility of a redesign like MCAS and ask-
ing whether the redesign would be a RAD. The answer may be
negative if the redesign introduced disutilities that outweigh the
reduction in expected accident losses. The insight of a systems
approach to this issue is that the risk–utility comparison may re-
fer to multiple risks arising from different sources, yet they are
linked to each other. The introduction of MCAS reduces the
risk of inadvertent stalls, which is already fairly low for the most
part due to training, good airmanship, and commitment to fol-
lowing standard procedures. The reduction in stall risk, how-
ever, is associated with a heightened risk of trim runaway. The
likelihood of an accident related to this risk can also be miti-
gated by training, airmanship, and following standard proce-
dures. However, doing so may require the provision of
additional information by the manufacturer about the opera-
tion of the safety feature. Thus, we must consider Boeing’s liabil-
ity for failure to provide warnings and instructions concerning
MCAS.
2. Information-Defect Claims Related to MCAS
The duty of the manufacturer regarding information (warn-
ings and instructions) is simple to state: It must provide instruc-
tions and warnings that are reasonably adequate to inform
product users of an unknown risk and to take steps to avoid or
mitigate that risk.173 What is reasonable, however, varies accord-
ing to a number of factors, including the skill and experience of
172 See Broderick et al., supra note 11.
173 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(c) & cmt. i.
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users and the severity of the unknown risk.174 Liability should
not be imposed for failure to warn of trivial risks, and much of
the reason for this limitation is the concern for swamping infor-
mation about serious risks in a sea of warnings about inconse-
quential hazards. It is easy to find examples of silly warnings
attached to everyday products.175 Many manufacturers appar-
ently regard the cost of providing additional warnings as trivial
and a rational safeguard against the possibility of a failure-to-
warn claim. In theory, a plaintiff might be able to establish that
he or she overlooked a warning of an unknown, serious hazard
because it was part of a long list of warnings for known or minor
risks. As much as courts talk about the problem of “warnings
clutter,”176 however, I am not aware of any successful claim for
damages based on this type of theory. Over-warning therefore
seems likely to continue to be the strategy employed by
manufacturers.
In light of this observation, it is telling that Boeing chose to
say nothing about the presence and operation of MCAS, which
(according to the plaintiffs) presents a risk that even well-
trained flight crews are unlikely to be aware of. Boeing’s re-
sponse is that pilots already trained on 737 NG aircraft, and for
that matter of any transport-category jet, can be expected to
know of the risk of a trim runaway and have committed the pro-
cedure for dealing with the problem to memory.177 But some of
the features of the integration of MCAS with the flight control
system of the 737 Max may present hazards that a reasonable
pilot may not be aware of. One of the plaintiffs’ strongest fail-
ure-to-warn arguments will relate to the difference in behavior
between the NG and the Max when the pilot pulls back on the
yoke in response to nose-down trim. The two aircraft designs
differ in the way they interact with the flight crew.178 Put simply,
the NG allows the pilot to override the nose-down trim input,
while the Max assumes the pilot’s back pressure on the yoke is
174 See id. § 2 cmt. i.
175 Examples include: a sticker on a baby stroller warning, “Remove child
before folding”; a brass fishing lure with a three-pronged hook on the end with a
label indicating, “Harmful if swallowed”; or a cardboard car sunshield completely
covering the windshield that warns, “Do not drive with sunshield in place.”
176 See, e.g., Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 937–39 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Broussard v. Continental Oil Co., 433 So. 2d 354, 358 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
177 See Gates & Baker, supra note 23. During the flight test and certification
process for the 737 Max, Boeing assumed that a crew would recognize and deal
appropriately with a trim runaway within three seconds. See id.
178 Fehrm, supra note 15.
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itself a problem to be corrected by aggressive nose-down trim.179
Pilots who became accustomed to dealing with uncommanded
trim inputs by simply holding back pressure against the trim
would likely not realize that, instead of shutting off, the auto-
matic nose-down trim would only become more determined to
follow the logic of its programming. More drastic action is re-
quired, and pilots have no way of knowing this.
Soon after the Lion Air 610 accident, the FAA issued an Emer-
gency Airworthiness Directive (AD),180 requiring 737 Max oper-
ators to add details to the trim runaway procedure spelled out in
the existing Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM). The new language
specifically alerts crews to the operation of MCAS: “Note: The
737-8/-9 [i.e., the Max] uses a Flight Control Computer com-
mand of pitch trim to improve longitudinal handling character-
istics. In the event of erroneous Angle of Attack (AOA) input,
the pitch-trim system can trim the stabilizer nose down in incre-
ments lasting up to 10 seconds.”181 It then directs pilots to use
the existing runaway trim procedure, including pulling the
STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches, but it emphasizes that higher-
than-usual control forces may be necessary and also advises that
pilots may need to use nose-up trim to bring the aerodynamic
forces under control.182 In other words, this may be something
more than the garden-variety trim runaway.
The dollar cost of adding this warning is trivial, and there is
no issue of warnings clutter when the additional information
would be added to an already lengthy and detailed AFM. So why
did Boeing avoid providing this information from the begin-
ning? The answer, again, is related to its marketing strategy of
selling the 737 Max as capable of being flown by crews type
rated on the 737 NG, without extensive differences training. Ad-
mitting the existence of MCAS—disclosed in the language of
the AD as “a Flight Control Computer command of pitch trim to
improve longitudinal handling characteristics”183—would have
prompted questions from airlines about the functioning of this
179 See id.
180 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., (AD) 2018-23-51, EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIREC-
TIVE (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/continued_operation
/ad/type_pub/type_emerg [https://perma.cc/29JG-SYA6] (final rule proposed
at 83 Fed. Reg. 63,561 (Dec. 11, 2018)).
181 Id. at 4.
182 See id. See also the discussion of the “roller coaster” recovery technique,
supra note 44.
183 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE, supra note
180, at 4.
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system and the need for additional simulator training. Boeing
apparently assumed that pilots would react to any pitch trim
anomaly by using the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches, not by
holding pressure on the control yoke against the trim.184 The
trouble is, the design for the existing 737 NG aircraft permitted
the “pull against trim” work-around, and pilots became familiar
with it.185 It may not have been the approved procedure in the
AFM, but it is certainly not unusual for pilot folklore to include
unofficial procedures for accomplishing tasks.
The failure-to-warn test is doctrinally and conceptually no dif-
ferent from ordinary negligence analysis. The question is
whether a reasonable person in the manufacturer’s position
would have provided the warning. There is a tacit question lying
behind the reasonableness analysis, namely whether to permit
the consideration of purely self-interested reasons for acting. In
a sense, Boeing did act reasonably if one considers the reported
fact that it was obligated to pay customers $1 million per air-
plane sold if airlines had to provide supplemental training for
737 Max crews.186 Surely a reasonable person would want to
avoid a financial penalty that sizeable. It is clear from an eco-
nomic approach to negligence that the reasonable person stan-
dard is indifferent between costs to the manufacturer and
expected accident losses.187 Even at common law, however,
there is arguably no requirement that the reasonable person act
altruistically. The leading American mid-twentieth century torts
treatise—i.e., before the rise of law and economics—quoted ap-
provingly from a 1927 law review article stating that, applying
negligence analysis, “an actor ‘is permitted . . . to condemn the
interests of others to his own use to the extent that he is permit-
ted to act without liability although knowing that his conduct
involves a substantial chance of injuring persons or property of
others.’”188 In a straightforward Hand formula analysis, if the
likelihood of an inadvertent MCAS response outside its in-
tended range of operation is as small as Boeing thought it was, it
might have considered the “PL” term of the formula to be con-
184 See Fehrm, supra note 15.
185 See id.
186 See Gates & Baker, supra note 23.
187 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33–34
(1972).
188 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.4, at 395 (2d ed. 1986)
(quoting Warren A. Seavey, Negligence – Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1,
8 n.7 (1927)).
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siderably less than the $1 million per airplane it stood to lose if
it disclosed the existence of the system to purchasers.189 Al-
though this approach to negligence analysis has its critics,190 it is
close enough to the conventional wisdom that Boeing cannot
necessarily be considered greedy or heartless for considering its
own potential economic losses in connection with the informa-
tion about MCAS. Having said that, however, there is no re-
quirement that a jury perform the kind of impartial economic
cost–benefit analysis recommended by Posner and his ilk.191 A
jury may well decide that a reasonable person would have pro-
vided this information.
Boeing’s further defense to a failure-to-warn claim will likely
be that if the pilots of Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian Airlines 302
had promptly done what the AFM instructed them to do, they
would have disabled MCAS and stopped the nose-down trim in-
puts before the plane’s airspeed increased to the point that a
recovery was impossible. This is not an argument on the duty or
standard of care for warnings. There is no question that Boeing
had a duty to warn and should have provided reasonably ade-
quate information about the MCAS-related risk and how to miti-
gate it. Rather, the argument pertains to causation, which
presents subtle issues in many products liability cases, particu-
larly those involving systems accidents. The failure to provide
information about MCAS did have a causal connection to the
accident, but at least in the case of Lion Air 610, the accident
would not have occurred without the failure of the flight crew to
follow the procedure specified in the AFM.192 This means causal
responsibility is shared between the manufacturer and user, and
it must be apportioned by the trier of fact.
189 See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
190 See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 3, 31 (1988). See generally MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONA-
BLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD
(2003).
191 See Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015,
1045–46 (1994).
192 Although the final accident report is not yet available, some reporting
based on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recovered from the wreckage of Ethi-
opian Airlines 302 suggests that the crew promptly cut out the stabilizer trim and
attempted to manually retrim nose up. See Ahmed et al., supra note 6. If these
reports are accurate, it may be that MCAS is defective in design because its nose-
down trim inputs were so aggressive that there is no conceivable way for the crew
to override the system before the airspeed got too high to preclude manually
retrimming.
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C. CAUSATION, SUPERSEDING CAUSATION, AND THE RELEVANCE
OF USER ERROR
Products liability claims are subject to the same factual and
legal (proximate) causation requirements as ordinary negli-
gence claims.193 The conceptual confusion discussed above, re-
sulting from occasional stubborn insistence that products
liability claims are “really” strict liability, has sometimes caused
courts to introduce new terminology and draw unwarranted dis-
tinctions, e.g., between “proximate” and “producing” cause.194
But once all of the language and categories are parsed carefully,
it turns out that the causation analysis is just the same as the
familiar negligence approach. First, the plaintiff must show that
“but for” the product defect—whether the manufacturer’s fail-
ure to adopt a RAD (design defect) or the manufacturer’s provi-
sion of inadequate warnings or instructions—the accident more
likely than not would not have occurred.195 Where there are
multiple causes, the “but for” requirement changes to an analy-
sis of whether each individual cause was a substantial factor in
bringing about the accident.196 As long as the accident would
not have occurred without any particular event, each event is a
cause, even if not the cause.197 Second, the plaintiff must show
legal causation, in the sense that the accident that occurred is of
a type that, considered ex ante, would have required the adop-
tion of a RAD or the provision of additional warnings and in-
structions.198 There are many cases in which the defendant
might argue a lack of proximate cause because the harm that
occurred was not “within the risk” that required a different de-
sign or information from the manufacturer. There is no plausi-
ble argument along these lines in connection with the 737 Max.
The risk requiring the adoption of a RAD is exactly the risk that
manifested itself in the Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian Airlines 302
193 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 15 (AM. LAW INST. 1998)
(“Whether a product defect caused harm to persons or property is determined by
the prevailing rules and principles governing causation in tort.”). The familiar
proximate cause analysis now goes under the heading of “Scope of Liability” in
the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 29 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). I expect the old, familiar term to hang on for a long
time with lawyers and judges, however.
194 See, e.g., Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995).
195 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 26 cmt. b.
196 See id. § 27 & cmt. b.
197 See id. § 26 cmt. d.
198 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 16 cmt. b.
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accidents—loss of control resulting from a sudden, uncom-
manded control input.
The claims of an overly aggressive and undisclosed MCAS are
causally connected in the right way to engineering and market-
ing decisions made by the manufacturer. But other claims may
fail on factual causation. For example, some of the complaints
filed in connection with these accidents cite the absence of the
“AOA Disagree” warning light as a defect in the product.199
Under the circumstances of either accident, where the crews
were confronted with an unexpected and dramatic nose-down
pitch attitude, even if they had been warned of a disagreement
between the two AOA sensors, that information would be irrele-
vant to solving the immediate problem unless they had also
been informed previously about the operation of MCAS and its
reliance on AOA data. In other words, a claim based solely on
the absence of the AOA Disagree light as the theory of defect
would fail for a lack of evidence of factual causation.200
Non-lawyers sometimes misunderstand causation and believe
that if one event was a causal factor, then other potentially re-
sponsible parties are off the hook. Boeing’s stock price briefly
went up when news reports indicated that a bird strike may have
disabled the captain’s side AOA sensor on the Ethiopian 302
accident aircraft.201 If these reports were accurate, it would be
true in a sense the bird strike “caused” the accident, but so did:
(1) the choice by engineers to trigger the operation of MCAS
based on data from only one AOA sensor; (2) the failure of the
flight crew to recognize the runaway trim and cut out the elec-
tric pitch trim in a timely fashion; and (3) Boeing’s decision not
to inform pilots about the existence of MCAS, which might have
made them a little less likely than they otherwise might have
been to recognize and resolve the runaway trim. If investors
thought the news about the bird strike somehow absolved Boe-
ing of a causal role in the accident, they failed to understand the
doctrine of concurrent causation. The unfortunate bird, the
crew, and the manufacturer all made causal contributions to the
accident. It may even have been necessary for all of them to oc-
199 See, e.g., Complaint at 28–29, Vdovic v. Boeing Co., No. 2:19-cv-01455-DCN
(D.S.C. May 17, 2019); Complaint at 7, K’Obien v. Boeing Co., No. 1:19-cv-03285
(N.D. Ill. May 15, 2019).
200 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 26 cmt. g.
201 See Josephs, US Aviation Officials Think a Bird Strike Was Factor in 737 Max
Crash, supra note 38.
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cur.202 In aviation, the phenomenon of jointly necessary causes
is often referred to as the “Swiss cheese” model of accidents—all
the holes in slices of Swiss cheese need to line up for the hole to
go all the way through, so preventing an accident is often a mat-
ter of taking only one of several jointly necessary causes out of
the event.203 For liability purposes, anyone responsible for a slice
of the cheese may be liable to the plaintiff; the trier of fact will
apportion percentages of responsibility on the basis of a number
of factors.204
As is well known, tort liability evolved from a regime in which
one actor was deemed the cause of a mishap, through the devel-
opment of comparative fault, to one in which multiple parties
can be assigned percentage shares of liability based on the jury’s
assessment of their comparative responsibility.205 Courts apply-
ing traditional all-or-nothing contributory negligence principles
expressed the firm resolution not to diminish the plaintiff’s re-
sponsibility by assigning some liability to the defendant.206 Of
course, the flip side was also the case—by assigning all the liabil-
ity to the contributorily negligent plaintiff, the defendant was
off the hook entirely. Starting with the leading California Su-
preme Court case Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,207 courts began to recog-
nize that multiple parties could bear responsibility
simultaneously for an accident. Unlike some of the innovations
of the 1960s tort revolution, comparative fault caught on almost
everywhere, and now the great majority of U.S. jurisdictions in-
struct the factfinder to apportion liability between the plaintiff
and defendant or defendants, and among joint tortfeasors.208
Obviously there is no possibility of finding the plaintiffs—the
relatives of passengers killed in the Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian
Airlines 302 crashes—contributorily negligent. The relevant ap-
portionment of responsibility will be between the jointly liable
202 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 26 cmt. e.
203 See REASON, THE HUMAN CONTRIBUTION, supra note 99, at 95–103.
204 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 8 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
205 See id.
206 See, e.g., Butterfield v. Forrester (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (casebook classic
stating that “[o]ne person being in fault will not dispense with another’s using
ordinary care for himself.”).
207 32 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975).
208 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 7 reporters’
note cmt. a. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Case for
Comparative Negligence, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067 (1986).
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tortfeasors of Boeing, possibly component parts suppliers, and
the airlines vicariously for the negligence (if any) of their
employees.
It may be the case that pilots who immediately recognized the
unexpected pitch down as a trim runaway and pulled the STAB
TRIM CUTOUT switches could have recovered from the errone-
ous MCAS deployment. It is always important, however, to re-
member that reasonable care, for the purposes of comparative
fault analysis, does not require performance at the very highest
level.209 When confronted by a sudden and unexpected emer-
gency, recovery may require some combination of skill, training,
discipline, teamwork, leadership, and pure dumb luck.210 A jury
may properly be reluctant to conclude that the Lion Air 610 and
Ethiopian Airlines 302 crews fell below the applicable standard
of care. Even if they did, however, the result would only be to
assign some percentage of responsibility to them (and vicari-
ously to their employers), not to exonerate Boeing altogether
for liability for design defect or failure to warn. Similarly, super-
seding causation functions in products liability law just as in neg-
ligence.211 A subsequent event does not break the causal chain
and absolve the manufacturer from responsibility for a design
defect or failure to warn if that subsequent event is one of the
risks that required a redesign or better information, respec-
209 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 283, 464 & cmt. f (AM. LAW INST.
1965).
210 See REASON, THE HUMAN CONTRIBUTION, supra note 99, at 221–36 (analyzing
in detail several near-catastrophes prevented or at least mitigated by extraordi-
nary human responses). Applying Reason’s analysis to US Airways Flight 1549,
the so-called “Miracle on the Hudson,” it is certainly the case that the captain and
first officer were well-trained, highly experienced, and worked well together in
dealing with the emergency. See Patrick Smith, The Heroics of Captain Sully and the
“Miracle on the Hudson,” ASK THE PILOT, https://www.askthepilot.com/question-
answers/sully-and-heroics/ [https://perma.cc/8HJJ-7ASK] (last visited Oct. 30,
2019). There is still an element of luck, however, in that the loss of both engines
occurred during daylight hours, with good visibility, within gliding distance of a
suitable (but unusual) landing site, and a flotilla of boats already on the scene to
rescue the occupants. See id. As airline pilot and widely read aviation blogger
Patrick Smith observes, while conceding Captain Sullenberger’s excellent deci-
sion making and coordination with First Officer Jeff Skiles, “[h]ad the engines
quit on a day with low visibility, or over a crowded part of the city beyond gliding
distance to the river, the result was going to be an all-out catastrophe. No amount
of skill would matter.” Id.
211 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 15 reporters’ note cmt.
a (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
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tively.212 Even on the assumption that one of the accident crews
was blameworthy, in the sense of falling below the standard of
care for professional aviators for not recognizing or reacting
quickly enough to the trim runaway, their negligence in no way
supersedes Boeing’s liability because one of the risks that re-
quired the company to strike the right risk–utility balance re-
garding MCAS is the risk that the stall-prevention system will
activate at an inappropriate time, requiring flight-crew interven-
tion. In proximate causation terms (of which the analysis of su-
perseding cause is a part), the possibility of an erroneous
human reaction is “within the risk” that requires the adoption of
a RAD or the provision of adequate warnings and instructions.
The term “misuse” has taken on a kind of talismanic quality
for manufacturers who seek to use the plaintiff’s misuse of a
product as a complete defense. The Third Restatement recog-
nizes that misuse is one of those terms in tort law, like assump-
tion of risk, that is susceptible to a wide range of meaning.213
The manufacturer’s duty is to design the product and provide
information in light of its foreseeable uses. If the user does
something so bizarre with the product that no reasonable manu-
facturer could have foreseen it, there is no duty to design
around or provide warnings concerning the risk thereby cre-
ated.214 That is one sense of misuse, akin to implied primary as-
sumption of risk.215 It would be unusual to encounter this sense
of misuse in connection with the design of a complex product
presenting many opportunities for foreseeable misuse. In avia-
tion, these would include slipups such as taking off with incor-
rect flap settings, forgetting to put down the gear for landing, or
letting the airspeed decay and stalling the aircraft. But a more
ordinary sense of misuse, in the sense of failure to use reasona-
ble care, may well be one of the risks that the manufacturer is
obligated to foresee and safeguard against, either with a RAD or
adequate warnings. Misuse in that sense would be like implied
secondary assumption of risk and would be simply another fac-
212 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 34 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.
§ 16 cmt. b.
213 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. p & reporters’
note cmt. p.
214 See id. § 2 cmt. p.
215 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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tor to be taken into account by the trier of fact in apportioning
responsibility among multiple actors.216
There is no viable defense of misuse or superseding causation
to the most serious allegations of design defect and insufficient
warnings. The flight-crew errors, if errors existed (and from
some reports at least, the Ethiopian 302 crew did everything
right),217 are just the sort of possibility that requires getting the
risk–utility balance right or providing adequate warnings or in-
structions. Provided that Boeing is prima facie liable on a de-
sign-defect or failure-to-warn theory, then the most it can expect
by way of relief from liability is to have some responsibility ap-
portioned to the airline, which is vicariously liable for the negli-
gence of its employees. That is the case even if the Lion Air and
Ethiopian Airlines crews had mishandled the emergency which,
again, is not at all clear. However, the possibility of flight-crew
error prompted or exacerbated by a design or information de-
fect raises the question of how, exactly, the trier of fact should
assign shares of responsibility. The Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Apportionment of Liability offers the following set of fac-
tors for consideration:
The nature of each person’s risk-creating conduct includes such
things as how unreasonable the conduct was under the circum-
stances, the extent to which the conduct failed to meet the appli-
cable legal standard, the circumstances surrounding the
conduct, each person’s abilities and disabilities, and each per-
son’s awareness, intent, or indifference with respect to the
risks.218
For example, a jury may conclude that even if the crew of one of
the 737 Max accident aircraft did not handle the emergency in
exactly the way they were supposed to, their conduct was not all
that unreasonable under the circumstances. These circum-
stances include: (1) the sudden onset of the emergency; (2) its
relatively unusual nature (compared with something that is
practiced frequently in the simulator); (3) the fact that it was
encountered at low altitude (giving them less time to work the
problem); and (4) the Max design’s removal of techniques that
737 NG pilots had learned to use in dealing with trim runaways.
The jury may therefore apportion relatively little responsibility
216 See 62A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1267 (2019).
217 See supra note 192.
218 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 8 cmt. c (AM.
LAW INST. 2000).
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to the flight crew, even though they may have fallen below the
applicable standard of care. On the other side, Boeing’s aware-
ness of the risks and its attitude toward them may be a factor in a
substantial apportionment of liability to the company.
D. BOTTOM LINE
Assuming something like MCAS was necessary to ensure suffi-
cient longitudinal stability to satisfy FAA certification standards
for the 737 Max,219 two available, technologically feasible design
changes would have been RADs. These are: (1) relying on data
from two AOA sensors; and (2) a single application of nose-
down trim, not repeated inputs.220 The first design feature
would have reduced the risk an erroneous pitch down and the
second would have prevented the system from fighting the flight
crew. Note, however, that the second redesign would have some-
what reduced the utility of MCAS as an anti-stall system. It would
still be necessary to rely on flight crews to recognize that they
were approaching a stall and respond accordingly. There is no
100% technological solution available, at least with existing tech-
nology, to mitigate the risk of another Air France 447 or Colgan
3407 accident. Because a RAD is available, by definition, the 737
Max has a design defect for which Boeing is liable. Although
evidence of the company making these changes will be inadmis-
sible at trial to prove a defect,221 it is useful for the purpose of
analysis to observe what changes will be made to the aircraft’s
design before it reenters service.
The company is also very likely to be liable for the plaintiffs’
warnings and information claims. Although the risk of trim run-
aways is already known, pilots needed to know that MCAS was
not an ordinary trim runaway and could not be managed using
work-around procedures that had been developed over time by
737 NG crews, and also that the aerodynamic forces involved in
a recovery would be higher than expected. Even if a trier of fact
concludes that the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crews fell
below the applicable standard of care—which seems unlikely
due to the unusual nature of the MCAS activation as compared
219 See Gates & Baker, supra note 23.
220 See discussion supra section III.A.2.a–b.
221 See FED. R. EVID. 407 (referring to liability for design and warnings defects,
among other causes of action, which may not be proven through the introduc-
tion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures).
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with ordinary trim runaways—their negligence would serve only
as a damages-reducing factor, not a complete defense.
On the substantive law of products liability, Boeing is there-
fore looking at the possibility of substantial liability exposure re-
sulting from these two accidents. It may be able to succeed in
moving to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens,222 but
the procedural aspects of the litigation are not the subject of
this Article. The Montreal Convention governs the liability of
the air carriers in the two 737 Max accidents in question, and it
creates a rule of strict liability for injuries resulting from an acci-
dent.223 However, the Convention permits the carriers to assert
an action for contribution against Boeing.224 Serious settlement
negotiations will undoubtedly have to await the resolution of
motions to dismiss and other jurisdictional maneuvering, but on
the underlying law, there is little doubt that Boeing is facing
liability for design defect and failure to warn.
IV. SYSTEMS THINKING AND SYSTEMS RISKS IN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
Rapid advances in artificial intelligence research and progress
in fields such as autonomous cars have created a sense that risks
resulting from human error can be designed out of complex
undertakings, including aviation. The attitude of Wall Street Jour-
222 See, e.g., Lleras v. Excelaire Servs. Inc., 354 F. App’x 585, 587 (2d Cir. 2009)
(dismissing for forum non conveniens in favor of Brazil in action arising out of
collision between a business jet and an airliner over Brazil); In re Air Crash Over
Mid-Atlantic on June 1, 2009, 760 F. Supp. 2d 832, 847 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (litiga-
tion arising out of Air France 447 accident dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds). The adequacy of the alternative forum—in this case, presumably, Ethi-
opia and Indonesia—is an element the defendant must establish in order to jus-
tify dismissal. See In re Air Crash, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 839. Interestingly, in an air
crash case subject to the New Zealand Accident Compensation Commission (no
fault) scheme, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the no-fault remedy was ade-
quate, and New Zealand was a suitable alternative forum for the claim against an
American manufacturer of avionics equipment and a Canadian aircraft manufac-
turer. See Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1141–43 (9th Cir. 2001).
The controlling Supreme Court precedent is Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235 (1981).
223 See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Car-
riage by Air art. 21, May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13,083, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309.
224 See In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., August 27, 2006, No. 5:06-CV-316-KSF,
2008 WL 440293, at *2–3 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2008) (applying Article 37 of the
Montreal Convention and permitting the air carrier Comair to file third-party
complaints for contribution).
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nal opinion writer Holman Jenkins offers an optimistic view of
the promise of technology:
Passengers might never be ready to board a plane that doesn’t
have a human crew member, but that should not stop designers
from asking whether planes wouldn’t already be safer (as well as
cheaper and simpler) if not required to be built around a system
element ([aka] the pilot) whose memory and computational re-
sources are far less than a laptop computer’s.
This is not to denigrate the skills and instincts of a great pilot,
but notice that it’s been a decade since the skills and instincts of
the world’s greatest chess masters have been able to beat a
computer.225
To which the obvious response is that one thing computers can-
not do is improvise a solution to a previously unimaginable
problem, like Captain Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger’s decision to
land on the Hudson River, rather than trying to turn back to
LaGuardia, when both engines failed after ingesting a flock of
Canada geese in the climbout.226 Whatever a computer would
have done in that situation, it almost certainly would not have
been to attempt a water landing on the Hudson, which turned
out to be the only sensible option available.227 Not every acci-
dent is Colgan 3407, where taking the human operator out of
the loop seems in hindsight like a good idea, but then again,
neither is every incident the “Miracle on the Hudson,” where
the surviving passengers are all thanking their lucky stars that it
was a human flying the plane, not a computer. More to the
point, the Wall Street Journal editorial displays a naı¨ve confidence
that a risk-mitigation strategy can be devised that relies either on
increased competence by human operators or increasingly capa-
ble automation.228 In all likelihood, the best risk-mitigation strat-
egy is a combination of human and machine competence, but
225 Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Boeing vs. Pilots?, WALL ST. J. (May 31, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-vs-pilots-11559341016 [https://perma.cc/
7ZMZ-UWV3].
226 This is a point made by several letters in response to Jenkins’s column. See
Letters, You Need a Human Pilot When the Airplane’s Computers Fail, WALL ST. J.
(June 5, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/you-need-a-human-pilot-when-the-
airplanes-computers-fail-11559763986 [https://perma.cc/28UL-WYSF]; see also
William Langewiesche, Anatomy of a Miracle, VANITY FAIR (May 5, 2009), https://
www.vanityfair.com/culture/2009/06/us-airways-200906 [https://perma.cc/
TKM7-AEFN].
227 See Langewiesche, Anatomy of a Miracle, supra note 226 (giving a pilot’s per-
spective on Captain Sullenberger’s decision making).
228 See You Need a Human Pilot When the Airplane’s Computers Fail, supra note 226.
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this strategy presents its own analytical challenges for tort and
products liability law.
The 737 Max accidents underscore something that is well
known in the aviation community but may not be appreciated by
lawyers, namely that a mitigation technique, whether technolog-
ical or human-centered, aimed at reducing a primary risk can
create or exacerbate a distinctive type of secondary risk.229 For
example, some evidence was developed by the NTSB following
the crash of Northwest Flight 255 at the Detroit Metropolitan
Airport that flight crews had gotten into the habit of using a
designed-in safety feature, i.e., the takeoff-configuration warn-
ing system, as a way of ensuring proper flap settings for takeoff
instead of the proper procedure of using standardized flows and
checklists.230 The most direct cause of the accident was pilot er-
ror—the failure to set takeoff flaps and the failure to follow pre-
taxi and pre-departure checklists that required verification of
the proper flap setting231—but the secondary risk that flight
crews may get sloppy with procedures is foreseeable based on
the inclusion of the takeoff-configuration warning system as a
means of reducing the primary risk of incorrect takeoff flap set-
tings.232 (Returning to the Swiss cheese model of accidents, the
warning system malfunctioned at the same time that a crew
missed the flap setting on the pre-departure checklist—the
holes of the cheese slices had to line up for the accident to
occur.)233
A more complex and subtle example is the Air France 447
accident, in which a flight crew believed that a highly automated
aircraft was “stall proof” and therefore the rapid descent it was
experiencing could not have been the result of a stall.234 It is
true that the Airbus A330 incorporated advanced envelope pro-
229 See PERROW, supra note 2, at 132.
230 See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/AAR-88/05, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT RE-
PORT: NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-82, N312RC, DE-
TROIT METROPOLITAN WAYNE COUNTY AIRPORT, ROMULUS, MICHIGAN, AUGUST 16,
1987, at 64 (1988). There was some evidence that the crew was having an “off
day,” and the first officer may have been distracted by other duties at the moment
he ordinarily would have set the flaps for takeoff. Id. at 56–60. Be that as it may,
this was still a pretty big mistake to make. Even in small planes, proper takeoff
flap setting is one of those items on the “things that can kill you” mental checklist
that every pilot learns to verify twice or three times prior to taking the runway for
departure.
231 Id. at 68.
232 See id. at 64.
233 See supra text accompanying note 203.
234 See Langewiesche, The Human Factor, supra note 20.
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tection systems designed to prevent pilots from getting any-
where close to the critical angle of attack of the wing. The
trouble is that the protections afforded by those systems were
lost when air data became unreliable due to in-flight icing. The
important observation here is that by designing the primary risk
of a stall out of the system, Airbus engineers may have increased
a secondary risk of flight-crew complacency or inattention to ba-
sic principles of aeronautics.235 If the crew had simply main-
tained a set pitch attitude and power setting, the plane would
have flown out of the area of icing, the automated systems would
have returned to their original functionality, and several hours
later, everyone would have walked off the plane in Paris.236 The
surprising reaction of the crew to the momentary flight control
anomaly was not truly unforeseeable; rather, it was the predict-
able result of the increasingly pervasive emphasis by manufactur-
ers and airlines on technological solutions to risks associated
with human–machine interactions.
Product-related risks arise out of the interaction between the
product and the user’s experience with it. This sounds like an
obvious point, but lawyers sometimes focus only on risks as a
property of the product without thinking about the safety as-
pects of the product in connection with the way it is typically
used. The risk and utility aspects of a product’s design, which
determine whether a redesign is a RAD under section 2(b) of
the Third Restatement,237 are both features of the user’s needs
and expectations regarding the performance of the product.
Over time, the experience of a number of users with the prod-
uct may reveal either previously unknown risks or a pattern of
errors in the use of the product that potentially call for a tech-
nological solution. The introduction of technology, including
automating tasks formerly performed by humans, then creates
new challenges for humans interacting with the product. Airline
pilot and human-factors researcher Sidney Dekker rightly ob-
serves: “Increasing automation transforms hands-on operators
into supervisory controllers, into managers of a suite of auto-
mated and other human resources. With their new work come
new vulnerabilities, new error opportunities. With [ ] new inter-
faces . . . come new pathways to human–machine coordination
235 See PALMER, supra note 20, at 179–82.
236 See id. at 160.
237 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
2019] 737 MAX PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION 433
breakdown.”238 Automation is only one type of defensive action
against human error that can be employed by product design-
ers. Alerts, such as the “AOA Disagree” indication or a takeoff-
configuration warning horn, can also function to interrupt the
link between human error and an accident. Designers and users
can also rely on more direct means of reducing human error,
such as training, supervision, following standardized proce-
dures, cross-checking by other crew members, and the like.239
Given the availability of means of engineering out human er-
ror, a strong claim sounding in systems thinking would be Don
Norman’s assertion that there is really no such thing as human
error, only bad design.240 As he rightly observes, human errors
fall into predictable patterns, and a product designer armed
with information about the foreseeable types of errors likely to
be made by users of their products should be able to improve
the product’s design to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the
effect of the errors.241 For example, many World War II-era air-
planes had handles for the flaps and landing gear that were lo-
cated close together, and both were topped with similarly
shaped knobs.242 Naturally, a careful pilot would intend to verify
that she is selecting either the gear or flaps up or down, but it is
predictable that in a busy phase of flight, the pilot might get
distracted and grab the wrong handle, which could make things
exciting.243 This risk can be mitigated, however, by topping the
flap handle with a wedge-shaped knob and the gear handle with
238 DEKKER, TEN QUESTIONS ABOUT HUMAN ERROR, supra note 125, at 152.
239 See, e.g., WEBB & WALKER, supra note 100, at 106 (claiming that, as com-
pared with technological advances, “the stabilized approach,” a requirement that
is part of all airline standard operating procedures, “has saved more lives than
any invention or innovation since aviation began.”).
240 NORMAN, supra note 2, at 162–69; see also SIDNEY DEKKER, JUST CULTURE:
BALANCING SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 131 (2007) (contrasting the “old view,” in
which the cause of accidents was assumed to be the human involved, and the
response was to “suspend, retrain, admonish, [or] charge him or her,” with the
new view that human error is a symptom of trouble within the system, not a
cause).
241 See NORMAN, supra note 2, at 167–68.
242 DEKKER, TEN QUESTIONS ABOUT HUMAN ERROR, supra note 125, at 7; Paul M.
Fitts & R.E. Jones, Analysis of Factors Contributing to 460 “Pilot-Error” Experiences in
Operating Aircraft Controls, in SELECTED PAPERS ON HUMAN FACTORS IN THE DESIGN
AND USE OF CONTROL SYSTEMS 332, 338–39 (H. Wallace Sinaiko ed., 1961).
243 See Fitts & Jones, supra note 242, at 340–41. Bringing up the flaps immedi-
ately after takeoff, without sufficient airspeed, could lead to a stall and a crash if
the stall is not immediately recovered. On the other hand, the landing gear are
retracted shortly after takeoff, as soon as a positive rate of climb is established, to
reduce drag and allow the plane to accelerate to its best climb speed.
434 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [84
a wheel-shaped knob, providing a tactile cue to the pilot.244 This
inexpensive, relatively unobtrusive design change could do
more to mitigate risk than continuing to rely on pilots not to
mess up. In the modern era, the emphasis on standardized pro-
cedures like flow patterns, callouts, checklists, and crew resource
management take as given that a certain amount of inattention
or sloppiness is residual in even the best, most well-intentioned
pilots.
One downside of applying Norman’s approach to products li-
ability law is the loss of focus on the performance of human op-
erators of complex systems. If there really is no such thing as
human error, only an inadequate design, then the legal system
could potentially fail to send liability signals to airlines that cre-
ate the right incentives for training and supervision. A response
to this possibility would, in theory, be to create an “acoustic sep-
aration” between the adjudication of liability and the training of
pilots.245 Going back to the Asiana 214 crash in San Francisco, it
may be the case that the 777 autoflight system is unnecessarily
complicated, and one could understand the crew being con-
fused about the effect of the vertical mode they selected on the
operation of the autothrottles.246 A trier of fact apportioning re-
sponsibility between the airline and the manufacturer might ac-
cordingly reduce the share of fault assigned to the crew.
However, the jury’s reduction in the crew’s share of responsibil-
ity would have the unfortunate effect of undercutting what
should be a perfectly clear and unambiguous message sent to all
pilots at all times: Watch your airspeed on approach! If they had
kept that very basic principle in mind, the accident would not
have occurred.
From the point of view of decision rules, addressed to a trier
of fact, it makes sense to consider the way fallible humans re-
spond when having to rapidly navigate a confusing interface
with a machine. Trust in automation builds over time as human
operators observe the automated systems performing appropri-
ately; however, the result may be less effort devoted to monitor-
ing. As Norman says, it makes no sense to merely blame human
error and continue doing things the same way we have always
done them if it is possible to redesign the product to mitigate
244 See id. at 340, 342.
245 See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Sepa-
ration in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 631 (1983).
246 See supra notes 135–44 and accompanying text.
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the risk of human error.247 Perhaps what is required is some-
thing like a “context-dependent low energy alerting system” to
provide an additional line of defense in the event that the flight
crew fails to notice rapidly decaying airspeed.248 However, that
perspective fails to capture an important commitment of pilots
and airlines to striving continually for better performance. From
the point of conduct rules, intended to influence the safety-re-
lated behavior of people in the real world, there should be no
compromise on a fundamental aspect of airmanship like air-
speed monitoring. It is drilled into the heads of pilots not to
make excuses, not to abdicate safety-related judgments to some-
one else, and to cultivate a “buck stops here” attitude regarding
safety. The automation is complicated? Too bad—take the time
to figure it out, follow standard procedures exactly, and click off
the automation and hand-fly if necessary. Systems thinking may
lead to an erosion of this highly functional mindset.
The need for acoustic separation may be overstated in this
context, however. Boeing and its customer airlines have signifi-
cant reputational interests of their own in maximizing safety.
The Asiana 214 crew was widely ridiculed for stuffing up a visual
approach in perfect weather. Two days after the accident and
long before the NTSB report was released, recognizing the im-
portance of public confidence in the company’s safety, the air-
line’s CEO had already committed to improving pilot training in
basic hand-flying skills.249 One function of products liability law
is to send deterrent signals, but it is by no means the only source
of incentives to improve safety. It is also not clear that a systems
approach to evaluating liability would have the effect of exoner-
ating the crew. The Third Restatement calls for the trier of fact
to apportion responsibility according to factors such as “how un-
reasonable the conduct was under the circumstances, the extent
to which the conduct failed to meet the applicable legal stan-
dard, the circumstances surrounding the conduct, [and] each
person’s abilities and disabilities.”250 Boeing could be expected
to argue forcefully at trial that habitual overreliance on automa-
247 See NORMAN, supra note 2, at 162.
248 See ASIANA 214 REPORT, supra note 135, at 130.
249 See, e.g., Ian Johnston, Asiana Airline Chief Says It Plans to Improve Pilot Train-
ing After San Francisco Crash, NBC NEWS (July 9, 2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.
com/_news/2013/07/09/19370461-asiana-airline-chief-says-it-plans-to-improve-
pilot-training-after-san-francisco-crash [https://perma.cc/4UNC-GLGT].
250 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 8 cmt. c (AM.
LAW INST. 2000).
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tion is itself conduct that falls below the applicable standard of
care. The pilot flying in the Asiana 214 crash was reported to
have said that he found visual approaches “very stressful” and
was confused by the 777 autoflight system.251 Apportionment
rules permit the trier of fact to find the airline (vicariously) lia-
ble for the lion’s share of damages in that case. But Norman’s
insight is still important. Systems thinking ensures that Boeing
cannot simply write this accident off as caused by egregious pilot
error. Each component of the system—the human and the ma-
chine—must be scrutinized to see whether it is possible to im-
prove the way they work together. The NTSB recommended,
among other things, that Boeing “develop enhanced 777 train-
ing that will improve flight-crew understanding of autothrottle
modes and automatic activation system logic through improved
documentation, courseware, and instructor training.”252 It made
this recommendation notwithstanding its conclusion that the
probable cause of the accident was
the flight crew’s mismanagement of the airplane’s descent dur-
ing the visual approach, the pilot flying’s unintended deactiva-
tion of automatic airspeed control, the flight crew’s inadequate
monitoring of airspeed, and the flight crew’s delayed execution
of a go-around after they became aware that the airplane was be-
low acceptable glidepath and airspeed tolerances.253
A weaker version of a systems approach yields a different and
more general insight for products liability law dealing with
human–machine interactions. To see the point, start with the
standard economic analysis of contributory negligence.254 On
this approach, liability rules should be constructed that mini-
mize the total social cost, in the form of the aggregate of precau-
251 Stephen Pope, Asiana 214 Pilot Found Visual Approach ‘Very Stressful,’ FLYING
(Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.flyingmag.com/technique/accidents/asiana-214-
pilot-found-visual-approach-very-stressful [https://perma.cc/NEV9-D2JQ]. The
major takeaway for pilots from the famous “Children of the Magenta Line” video
is that if you find yourself in a situation like the Asiana 214 crew—getting low and
slow on short final—the only acceptable response is to click off the autopilot and
autothrottles and make the plane do what you want it to do. See How to End Auto-
mation Dependency, supra note 134.
252 NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-14-039, at 1 (July 16,
2014), https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A-14-037-051.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3NZW-BYLR].
253 ASIANA 214 REPORT, supra note 135, at 129.
254 See generally A. MITCHELL POLINKSY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOM-
ICS 47–50 (3d ed. 2003); John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liabil-
ity, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973); David Haddock & Christopher Curran, An
Economic Theory of Comparative Negligence, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1985).
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tion costs by potential defendants (manufacturers, in products
liability), precaution costs by potential plaintiffs (product users),
and residual accident costs.255 The standard model treats com-
parative negligence as a partial defense, in the sense of a liabil-
ity-allocation rule, once the negligence of the defendant (a
design or information defect in products liability litigation) and
the failure of the plaintiff to use reasonable care have been es-
tablished.256 The economic case for comparative fault over con-
tributory negligence, or vice versa, relies on the ex ante
incentives created by either of those rules.257 The key premise in
the analysis is that the deviation by the defendant and the plain-
tiff from the applicable standard of care can be assessed inde-
pendently by the court, so that each party potentially faces a
penalty in the form of its share of the expected accident costs.258
Only then can each party determine the marginal level of spend-
ing on accident prevention.
Complex systems involving interactions between machines
and human operators pose a challenge to this model of ex ante-
incentive creation because of the dynamic relationship between,
on the one hand, features of the product’s design and informa-
tion provided by the manufacturer that are sensitive to patterns
of foreseeable user error, and on the other hand, user behavior
that is shaped by the product’s design and the information pro-
vided by the manufacturer. Something that starts out as a safety
feature, and may be justified on efficiency grounds on that basis,
may subsequently become a source of a new risk that is different
in kind and greater in magnitude than the original risk to be
mitigated. Go back to the example of Northwest 255.259 There is
a risk associated with the operation of any airline jet that an im-
proper flap setting could cause a crash on takeoff. What risk-
mitigation strategy should be adopted, thinking from the point
of view of minimizing aggregate social costs? There are a couple
of obvious options: (1) McDonnell-Douglas, the manufacturer
of the MD-80 aircraft, could design a takeoff-configuration warn-
ing system that caused a horn to blare if a flight crew pushed up
the power beyond a certain point with an improper flap setting;
or (2) flight crews could use ordinary care by adhering to stan-
dard procedures and making disciplined use of checklists. Stan-
255 See Haddock & Curran, supra note 254, at 54–55.
256 Id. at 56.
257 See id. at 70.
258 See id. at 56.
259 See supra notes 230–32 and accompanying text.
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dard economic analysis would consider the marginal costs of (1)
and (2), and seek to establish liability rules that put the onus on
the cheapest cost-avoider in the scenario. An armchair Calabre-
sian least-cost-avoider analysis might emphasize the likelihood
that even a well-intentioned crew could get interrupted in the
middle of running a checklist and inadvertently skip a critical
item. A takeoff-configuration warning system would mitigate this
risk. The upshot in terms of liability rules would therefore be
that the takeoff-configuration warning is a RAD, and an aircraft
lacking that design feature is defective. Furthermore, a flight
crew that missed the flap setting on the checklist would bear
either no or a lesser share of the responsibility for the accident.
But what about the phenomenon of crews becoming compla-
cent and dependent on the takeoff-configuration warning?
There is a lurking accident risk associated with the possibility of
the failure of the warning system. That risk would ordinarily be
relatively inconsequential because a crew using reasonable care
would run all the necessary checklists and catch an improper
flap setting. If the presence of the warning system tends to erode
caretaking over time, however, the residual risk associated with
failure of the warning system increases in magnitude.
A straightforward economic analysis of design defect and
comparative fault has difficulty with dynamic effects such as
automation dependency and complacency. Doctrinally, the
problem is not one of causation;260 rather, it is one of making
the initial determination of whether the manufacturers or the
users have deviated from the applicable standard of care. From
the economic approach, each actor is expected to make a utility-
maximizing tradeoff on the assumption that it will be required
to internalize any residual accident costs. The problem of inac-
curate adjudication of liability is well known in law and econom-
ics.261 An actor may take excessive precautions in order to create
a margin of error if it believes a fact finder is likely to err in
assessing compliance with the standard of care.262 Systems ef-
fects create an additional complication, however, by making ex-
pected accident costs into a moving target. A precaution taken
by the manufacturer at time t1 may be efficient in light of ex-
260 Cf. Maytal Gilboa, Multiple Reasonable Behaviors Cases: The Problem of Causal
Underdetermination in Tort Law, 25 LEGAL THEORY 77, 87–88 (2019).
261 See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 316–20,
343–45 (3d ed. 2000).
262 See id. at 320, 344.
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pected user behavior at that time.263 But it may have the effect of
inducing riskier user behavior at time t2 as users relax their own
caretaking in reliance on the precaution. One might respond
that the manufacturer must continuously reevaluate a product’s
design and may be required to adopt additional precautions at t2
to take account of observed changes in user behavior. But by
now, the manufacturer will be thinking, we have seen this
movie, and whatever we do at t2 is going to lead to some new and
as-yet unanticipated risk at time t3. How should the manufac-
turer perform the calculation of expected accident costs to de-
termine whether an additional precaution is required under
these circumstances?
It may be the case that, as Abraham and Rabin argue regard-
ing autonomous vehicles, the concept of a RAD is so indetermi-
nate that a negligence-based approach is no longer workable.264
They advocate for a regime of absolute manufacturer liability—
basically an insurance scheme—for all injuries resulting from
autonomous vehicle accidents.265 In the case of other highly
complex products prone to system effects, a similar conclusion
may be warranted, but it also may be the case that the liability
regime is there already. In most of the cases of commercial avia-
tion accidents in which automated systems and crew error are
both causally involved, a plaintiff’s design-defect claim would
likely get past summary judgment, at which point the manufac-
turer would be motivated to settle. Moreover, as noted above in
connection with the acoustic separation argument, the ex ante
decision making of the manufacturer will already be dominated
by reputational concerns and a genuine commitment to safety.
The possibility of tort judgments is a factor in evaluating design
changes such as MCAS, but manufacturers are already aiming at
an accident rate of zero, rather than seeking an economically
efficient level of precaution-taking. In its public statements
about the 737 Max, Boeing has not sought to minimize its obli-
gation to design the safest possible product, and all indications
are that when it returns to service, the defects in the aircraft will
have been rectified. Arguably the choice of liability rule is im-
portant here only as a decision rule, not a conduct rule.
263 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1998).
264 See Abraham & Rabin, supra note 1, at 144.
265 See id. at 153–55.
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The difficulty remains, however, with applying the decision
rule that apportions liability between the manufacturer and air-
lines in systems accidents. The black letter law is clear that the
conduct of both parties should be compared in terms of the ex-
tent of their deviation from the applicable standard of care.266
With the standard of care being a moving target, this compari-
son may be difficult. As with many theoretical difficulties in tort
law, however, it may be finessed in practice by simply instructing
the jury to make the comparison based on the evidence in the
record. Experts will have testified to the ways in which the de-
sign could have been improved and the flight crew could have
performed better. Based on this testimony, the jury will come to
a rough allocation of responsibility. This may be theoretically
unsatisfying, but it rightly avoids the strong claim that there is
no such thing as user error, only an inadequate design. To go
back to James Reason’s Swiss cheese metaphor, most systems ac-
cidents require the alignment of holes in many slices of cheese.
The existing law of products liability and apportionment of re-
sponsibility establishes an imprecise legal approximation of the
Swiss cheese model of accidents. Courts must take care, how-
ever, to craft jury instructions that focus the attention of jurors
on the interaction between would-be safety features and foresee-
able human error. Something that looks like an egregious in-
stance of human error may, in fact, be an understandable
adaptation to a design feature that was originally intended to
enhance safety. In the case of the 737 Max, for example, flight
crews may have become accustomed to the 737 NG work-around
of holding back pressure on the yoke against a nose-down trim
input. The resulting failure to follow the runaway trim checklist
is therefore less of a deviation from the applicable standard of
care than it initially appears. When assessing deviation from the
applicable standard of care, a trier of fact should be informed
that risks cannot be divided neatly into product defects and
human error. Rather, these two sources of risk influence each
other in complex ways. A properly instructed jury should be able
to handle the task of allocating responsibility, particularly with
the assistance of expert testimony that focuses on the interac-
tion between products and users.
266 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 8 cmt. c
(AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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V. CONCLUSION
Here is a confident prediction: The 737 Max design will be
modified, the airplane will return to service, and in a couple of
years, no one will have a second thought, upon boarding a 737,
about whether it is a Max or an NG. Boeing has already paid
substantial amounts voluntarily to compensate families of the
Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian Airlines 302 passengers,267 and it
will likely agree to hefty settlements if the U.S.-based products
liability lawsuits are not dismissed on forum non conveniens or
other grounds. It may have contractual agreements with pur-
chasers, including airlines and leasing companies, entitling
them to compensation for losses due to product defects.268 The
economic costs to the company will be significant, but consider-
ing the $60.7 billion in revenue of the Boeing Commercial Air-
planes division in 2018,269 one would expect that the company
and its shareholders will do just fine. In the long-run perspec-
tive, these two accidents will be remembered as tragic and avoid-
able but not unprecedented in the history of commercial
aviation.270 Why, then, bother writing an article about the 737
Max?
267 See Dominic Gates & Steve Miletich, Boeing’s $100 Million Pledge for 737 MAX
Crash Victims Sparks Criticism and Questions, SEATTLE TIMES (July 3, 2019), https://
www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-will-give-100-million-
to-max-crash-victims-families-and-communities [https://perma.cc/KQ29-G9KS].
268 Pure economic losses are not recoverable in tort actions alleging product
defects and instead are handled by the Uniform Commercial Code. See East River
S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872–74 (1986); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. a. American Airlines reportedly is
looking at a $350 million loss in connection with the grounding of its 737 Max
fleet. See Aaron Gregg & Douglas MacMillan, American Airlines Expects to Lose $350
Million Because of 737 Max Grounding, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/business/2019/04/25/southwest-airlines-grapples-with-fi
nancial-fallout-boeing-max-grounding [https://perma.cc/4286-WZDZ].
269 See Press Release, Boeing, Boeing Reports Record 2018 Results and Provides
2019 Guidance (Jan. 30, 2019), https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2019-01-30-Boe
ing-Reports-Record-2018-Results-and-Provides-2019-Guidance [https://perma.cc
/HLX2-ZFZW].
270 Other commercial airliners have suffered comparable rashes of accidents
and regulatory scrutiny. The McDonnell Douglas DC-10 experienced three fatal
crashes soon after its introduction into commercial service, prompting its
grounding for design changes. It reentered service, however, and proved to be
safe and reliable over its lifetime. See, e.g., Tom Richardson, Remembering the DC-
10: End of an Era or Good Riddance?, BBC NEWS (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.bbc.
com/news/uk-england-birmingham-26259236 [https://perma.cc/RNE2-4753];
DC-10 Nicknames and Reputation – Was It Really that Dangerous?, AIRWAYS MAG. (Feb.
21, 2014), https://airwaysmag.com/airlines/dc-10-nick-names [https://
perma.cc/XJ9U-4GKA]. Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner program was initially marred
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The answer is that we will see many more design- and informa-
tion-defect issues arising from human–machine interactions.
For example, while automakers and technology companies pre-
dict the capability to deploy fully autonomous cars by 2020 or
2021,271 for the next decade or so, it seems reasonable to predict
that most technologically advanced vehicles will require some
degree of human monitoring of the driving environment and
their performance.272 But there is considerable research show-
ing that humans are terrible at the task of monitoring systems
over long periods of time and intervening if necessary to prevent
a hazardous situation from developing.273 Somehow designers of
semiautonomous vehicles will have to find ways of coping with
human cognitive limitations and the foreseeable patterns of
human error that result from them. The design-defect analysis
of an accident involving a semiautonomous vehicle must there-
by a series of electrical fires, resulting in the grounding of all 787s. See, e.g., Umair
Irfan, How Lithium Ion Batteries Grounded the Dreamliner, SCI. AM. (Dec. 18, 2014),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-lithium-ion-batteries-grounded
-the-dreamliner [https://perma.cc/7L56-LGDC]. After a modification to the bat-
tery design, the aircraft returned to service and has experienced (to the best of
my knowledge) only one additional incident. See Christine Negroni, Boeing Dream-
liner’s Lithium-Ion Battery Fails on United Flight to Paris, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/christinenegroni/2017/12/01/dreamliners-be
leaguered-lithium-ion-battery-creates-problem-on-united-flight-to-paris/#33591e
178513 [https://perma.cc/TW8T-RTQJ]. However, pilots still refer to the 787 as
“Sparky.”
271 See Karen Hao, The Three Challenges Keeping Cars from Being Fully Autonomous,
MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613399/
the-three-challenges-keeping-cars-from-being-fully-autonomous/ [https://perma.
cc/B5GF-Y7DB].
272 The now-standard taxonomy of levels of automation was established by SAE
International, and is based on “who does what, when.” See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY:
ACCELERATING THE NEXT REVOLUTION IN ROADWAY SAFETY 9 (2016). SAE Level 5 is
full autonomy with no expectation of driver intervention. Id. The two levels of
high but not full automation are SAE Levels 3 and 4, defined respectively “as
[Level 3] can both actually conduct some parts of the driving task and monitor
the driving environment in some instances, but the human driver must be ready
to take back control when the automated system requests” and Level 4 “can con-
duct the driving task and monitor the driving environment, and the human need
not take back control, but the automated system can operate only in certain envi-
ronments and under certain conditions.” Id.
273 THOMAS B. SHERIDAN, HUMANS AND AUTOMATION: SYSTEM DESIGN AND RE-
SEARCH ISSUES 69–70 (2002).
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fore consider the vehicle and the human as a system, with each
component playing a role in risk creation and mitigation.274
More generally, the 737 Max accidents illustrate the limits of
technological utopianism. It is undoubtedly true that replacing
human pilots (or drivers, in the case of autonomous vehicles)275
with automated systems has the potential to reduce the risk of
certain types of accidents. But automation tends to create differ-
ent, offsetting risks, as well as foreclosing the possibility of acci-
dent avoidance through human creativity and improvisation.
The aggregate balance of risk and utility may very well be in
favor of increasing automation. The analysis of product defects
and comparative fault proceeds at the margin, however, and any
given innovation in technology must be assessed for its net con-
tribution to the utility of the product, including its safety as-
pects. This analysis, in turn, must take into account the ways in
which humans interact with the technology and adapt to its
presence, sometimes in ways that are detrimental to safety. Sys-
tems thinking is familiar in commercial aviation, so the 737 Max
accidents are a useful case study illustrating the linkage between
human performance and the safety features of products. They
show that safety is seldom a matter of focusing on the product or
the user in isolation but must consider the dynamics of
human–machine interaction. From that perspective, it is appar-
ent that the training and evaluation of users must include a
thorough understanding of the functioning of automated sys-
tems, and the design of products must take into account the
foreseeable risks posed by human cognitive limitations. The ex-
isting law of products liability can take this interaction into ac-
count, but it is important for courts and scholars not to look at
product design and human error in isolation, and to always con-
sider them as elements of a system. The applicable standard of
care for both manufacturers and users must be understood in
relation to the other component of the system (human or ma-
chine), its capabilities and limitations, and the way in which risks
and mitigation strategies interact. Systems accidents do not call
274 See Abraham & Rabin, supra note 1, at 140 (predicting that “driver ‘take-
over’ will often be central to safe operation [of semiautonomous vehicles], and
driver-takeover issues may be central in products liability litigation”).
275 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reports that 94% of
automobile accidents are caused by human error or decision making. See Auto-
mated Vehicles for Safety, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://
www.nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/automated-vehicles [https://perma.cc/
EK6L-DEVW] (last visited Oct. 31, 2019).
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for a wholesale reform of tort principles, but they do demand
careful application by judges and juries who are sufficiently well
informed about the limits of machine and human performance.
